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ABSTRACT

Current theories of conflict of laws have one common
feature: they all consider the question of the applicable law in
terms of a conflict between states. Legal systems are seen as
fighting with each other over the application of law to a certain
case. From this perspective, the goal of conflicts methods is to
assign factual situations to the competent rule maker for
resolution. Party autonomy presents a problem for this view: if
individuals are allowed to choose which law will be applied to
their dispute, it seems as if privatepersons could determine the
outcome of the battle between states-but how is this possible?
This Article tries to give a theoretical solution to this
puzzle. The underlying idea is that conflicts theory has to be
recalibrated. Its goal should not be to solve conflicts between
states, but to serve the individual, its needs and wants.
Through this shift of focus, it becomes not only possible to justify
party autonomy, but also to answer a number of practical
questions raised by it. Furthermore,this Article will propose a
new normative category, "relatively mandatory rules" and
discuss some important implications that the new approach
may have for conflict of laws generally.
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I. INTRODUCTION

When we think about the conflict of laws, we always think in
terms of states and their relations with each other. Using the
traditional method, for instance, we are looking for the state which
has the closest connection to the situation or in which the case has its
"seat."' Under a more modern paradigm, we analyze whether a state
2
has an "interest" in the case before applying its law.

1.

See FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

§§ 346, 360 (Guthrie trans., reprint Rothman 1972) (2d ed. 1880) (stating that in
determining the applicable law, one has to search for the seat of the legal relationship;
this approach is still prevalent in Europe); see, e.g., TITO BALLARINO, MANUALE BREVE
DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO 3 (2002), GERHARD KEGEL & KLAUS SCHURIG,
INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 310-11 (9th ed. 2004); PIERRE MAYER & VINCENT
HEUZt, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIt 83 (8th ed. 2004); JOSt CARLOS FERNANDEZ
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While it is certainly true that conflicts of law arise from the fact
that the world is composed of territorial states having separate and
differing legal systems, 3 the solution to the problem is not necessarily
to be found in seeing every case through the lens of states' territories
or states' interests. What we tend to forget is that choice of law, as
every other field of law, ultimately pertains to human relations. It
might therefore be preferable to include other factors in the analysis
as well.
The idea can be illustrated by the principle of party autonomy.
Over the course of the previous decades, the concept has taken over a
steadily growing field of the law. More and more, it is recognized that
parties are free to choose the applicable law.
While writers on conflicts have not overlooked this fact, they
have failed to provide a theoretical explanation why the parties are
allowed to choose the applicable law. The possibility of a choice-oflaw clause is mostly considered as a side-issue, or as one that is
problematic. 4 Although verbally recognized, party autonomy has
5
always remained a maverick within the edifice of conflicts theory.
Indeed, the freedom of the parties to choose the applicable law
must cause theoretical headaches to any serious positivist. If the law
that governs a legal relationship is objectively determinable by legal
analysis, how can the parties be free to choose another law as
applicable? If states' interests determine the choice-of-law process,
why should private individuals be able to change the outcome? Why
are they allowed to deselect even mandatory rules of the otherwise
applicable law? 6 Does such an allowance confer legislative power on
the parties?
Of course, one can try to dissolve these perplexities with the
"killer argument" that the parties are free to choose the applicable

RozAS & SIXTO SANCHEZ LORENZO, CURSO DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PRIVADO 399
(2d ed. 1993).
2.
See BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS 190
(1963) (advocating a solution to the choice-of-law problem by examining the interests of
the states involved).
3.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1 (1971).
4.
See, e.g., LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS 241 (1995) (arguing in the
context of choice-of-law clauses that "standing by itself, consent may not be
adequate."); see also LUTHER McDOUGAL ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICT OF LAWS 505
(2001) (mentioning party autonomy only on page 505 and immediately stressing that it
is subject to important limits); RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS 451 (4th ed. 2001) (stating "party autonomy rules either go too far or not far
enough."); LARRY KRAMER, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 329
(1990) (arguing that the parties should be allowed to choose the applicable law only
when there is potential for a true conflict, and that even in those cases they should not
be allowed to choose any law they like).
5.
See WEINTRAUB, supra note 4, at 451 (voicing doubts about the results
achieved by party autonomy); KRAMER, supranote 4, at 330 (asking why a state should
delegate to the parties even limited power to resolve conflicts).
6.
See infra Part II.
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law because the states' conflict rules allow them to do so. But this
leaves an important question unanswered: Why do the states give
parties this liberty? Also, the significance of a law that applies as a
result of private party choice, rather than authority, is far from clear.
Does such 'a law have a different application, construction or
What is missing is an exact explanation of party
interpretation?
autonomy, both as a matter of policy and as a matter of legal theory.
Such reflections, though principally done from an abstract
perspective, are not only of theoretical interest. On the contrary, they
are of highest importance in practice. First, they will help to clarify
the significance of a private choice of law, as well as its extent and
effects. 7 Second, such an analysis might also change the way in
which we approach the conflict question when the parties have not
chosen the applicable law: if we were to focus more on the parties
involved in a case and not on the states, we might adopt a more
8
individualized approach to the conflicts problem in general.
But let us begin from the start. In this Article, the Author will
attempt to demonstrate why current conflict-of-laws theory is unable
to account for party autonomy. After outlining the rise of party
autonomy in practice (Part II), the Article will examine the different
concepts and instruments that are used in today's conflicts theory
(Part III). These concepts and instruments are unable to grasp the
increasing influence of the parties on the applicable law because each
is based on the idea that conflicts of laws are battles between states.
In contrast, this Article will propound a theory of conflicts in which
the individual takes center stage and which leads to a new category of
legal rules: "relatively mandatory rules" (Part IV). Part V will
explore some implications of the new approach for the solution of
conflicts in practice.
It is equally important to indicate what this Article will not do.
The Article will not, at least not primarily, explore the limits to party
autonomy. Most writers have focused on those limits to ascertain the
nature of party autonomy. 9 There are two problems with this
approach: first, the limits to party autonomy are mostly idiosyncratic
to every legal system. Focusing on those limits does not facilitate
general expositions regarding party autonomy and its importance to
conflicts theory. Second, to define party autonomy by its limits is to
define a vacuum as being free from atmosphere. Far from being a
vacuum, party autonomy is an important legal principle that has its
roots in the recognition of individual freedom. Accordingly, the
Author will take a different approach and try to explain party

7.
See infra Parts lI.C, V.A.
See infra Part V.B.
8.
9.
See, e.g., McDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 4, at 505 (discussing the limits of
party autonomy).
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autonomy not as being void from something, but as justified in its
own right.
But first, it is important to further explore the problems of
today's conflicts theory raised by the freedom of the parties to choose
the applicable law.

II. THE GAP

IN CONFLICTS THEORY

A. The GrowingAcceptance of Party Autonomy
A revolution has taken place in the conflict of laws. This
"revolution" does not refer to the U.S. conflict-of-laws revolution,
which dates back to the 1960s and which shifted the focus of analysis
from factors such as territory and citizenship to the interests of the
states involved.' 0 Instead, on a global level, the true revolution has
been the growing acceptance of party autonomy as a way to
determine the applicable law.
Within the last decades, party autonomy has become the one
principle in conflict of laws that is followed by almost all
jurisdictions." Although there have been many precursors to party
autonomy, 12 the principle has never been as widespread in
application as it is today. It has been said that "perhaps the most
widely accepted private international law rule of our time is that the
parties to a contract are free to stipulate what law shall govern their
transaction."'1 3
The Institute of International Law calls party
autonomy "one of the fundamental principles of private international
law."'1 4 More and more states allow parties to cut the "Gordian knot"
of conflict of laws by choosing the applicable law themselves.' 5 The
spectacular rise of party autonomy can also be seen from the
development of the Restatement of Conflict of Laws: while the first

10.
See CURRIE, supra note 2, at 190 (writing as the main proponent of the U.S.
conflict-of-laws revolution).
11.
See generally SYMEON C. SYMEONIDEs, General Report, in PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE END OF THE 20TH CENTURY: PROGRESS OR REGRESS? 1, 38-

40 (1999) (demonstrating that party autonomy is followed by virtually all major legal
systems).
12.
See MAYER & HEUZE, supra note 1, at 509 (showing that in France, party
autonomy dates back as far as the sixteenth century); see also EUGENE F. SCOLES ET
AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 948 (4th ed. 2004) (indicating that some systems have
previously applied the principle of party autonomy).
13.
RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, Functional Developments in Choice of Law for
Contracts, 187 RECUEIL DES CoURS 239, 271 (1984).

14.
INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Resolution on the Autonomy of the
Parties in International Contracts Between Private Persons or Entities, 64 II Y.B. 383
(1992).
15.
See SYMEONIDES, supra note 11, Part I (showing the progression of states
allowing parties to choose the applicable law).
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Restatement's chapter on contracts did not contain any provision
allowing the parties to stipulate the governing law, 16 the
corresponding chapter of the second Restatement turned this freedom
17
into a general rule.
The principle of party autonomy is far from being applicable to
all fields of the law. Yet, its scope is increasingly extended and it is
For
now applied in areas where it was unthinkable before. 18
example, party autonomy has historically been resisted with respect
to questions related to the status of a person. 19 Under the traditional
view, status needs to be determined objectively and therefore the
applicable law cannot be changed at will. 20 Today, however, legal
systems have allowed private persons to influence the law governing
such questions as their name, 21 their capacity to contract, 22 or the
applicable matrimonial regime. 23 Party autonomy is now also
followed with regard to successions: under the U.S. Uniform Probate
Code, the testator is allowed (within certain limits) to choose the law
that will be applied with regard to the meaning and legal effect of a
deed or will. 24 Italy, Qu6bec and Switzerland also allow the testator
Convention proposes to
to choose the applicable law, 25 and a Hague
26
make this principle an international rule.

See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 311-331
16.
(missing a provision allowing parties to choose the governing law).

(1934)

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971)

(using

17.

parties' choice of governing law as a general principle).
See SYMEONIDES, supra note 11, at 56-57 (giving examples of areas of law
18.
where party autonomy has not been previously applied).
Id.
19.
Id.
20.
21.
See, e.g., Bundesgesetz vom 18. Dezember 1987 fiber das Internationale
Privatrecht [IPRG] [Swiss Private International Law Act], Dec. 18, 1987, SR 291, art.
37(2) (allowing individuals to choose the conflict-of-laws rules of their state of
nationality to govern their name).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 198(1), 187 (allowing
22.
private persons to choose, within certain limits, the law governing their capacity to
contract).
See, e.g., Bfirgerliches Gesetzbuch [German Civil Code], Aug. 18, 1896, RGBI
23.
at 195, Annex 1, art. 15(2) (F.R.G.) (amended 1986) (allowing private persons to
influence the law governing the matrimonial regime); Bundesgesetz vom 18. Dezember
1987 iber das Internationale Privatrecht [IPRG] [Swiss Private International Law
Act], Dec. 18, 1987, SR 291, art. 52 (allowing parties to select the law governing the
matrimonial regime); see also MAYER & HEUZE, supra note 1, at 771 (citing French case
law according to which the parties can select the applicable matrimonial regime).
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 1-202(18), 2-703 (2004) (providing that the
24.
notion "governing instrument" used in the Code includes deeds and wills).
Italian Law No. 218 of May 31, 1995, Gazz. Uff., June 3, 1995, art. 46(2);
25.
Civil Code of Quebec, S.Q., ch. 64, art. 3098(2) (1991); Bundesgesetz vom 18. Dezember
1987 fiber das Internationale Privatrecht [IPRG] [Swiss Private International Law
Act], Dec. 18, 1987, SR 291, arts. 90(2), 91(2).
26. Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Succession to the Estates of
Deceased Persons, art. 5(1), Aug. 1, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 150.
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The will of the individual has also gained significance in another
area in which it was historically held to be functionally excluded: tort
law. 27 For a long time, it was thought that party autonomy could not
play a role in torts. 28 However, in 2007 the European Union adopted
a regulation which allows parties to select the law applicable to all
non-contractual obligations, including those arising from torts. 29 The
selection must be made after the event which gave rise to the
damage, but if all parties are pursuing a commercial activity, it can
even be made beforehand. 30 In the case of environmental damages,
the person that sustained the damage will be allowed to deviate from
the normally applicable law and base its claim on the law of the
31
country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred.
Party autonomy has also become an important procedural
principle. In many countries, a court will apply its own law if the
parties argue their case based on that law, even if under the conflict
rules of the forum another law is applicable. 32 More and more,
parties are also allowed to explicitly choose the law that will be
applied to their dispute. 33 The peculiarity of procedural choice of law
is that the parties can circumvent the normally applicable choice-oflaw rules altogether. This makes clear how much the solution to the
conflicts problem has become subject to the parties' intentions.
It is true, however, that the parties are often limited in their
choice to certain legal systems. For instance, the spouses typically
can choose as the law governing their matrimonial regime only the
law of the state of which one of them is a citizen or in which both are

27.
See HAROLD L. KORN, Rethinking Personal Jurisdictionand Choice of Law
in Multistate Mass Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2183, 2193 (1990) (explaining that choice
of law in tort was formally decided by applying the lex loci delicti, or the law of the
place of injury).
28.
See id. at 2195 (observing the old hegemony of the lex loci delicti rule).
29.
EC Parliament/Council Regulation 864/2007 on the law applicable to noncontractual obligations ('"Rome Ir'), art. 14, 2007 O.J. (L 199) 40-49. The Regulation
will apply as of January 11, 2009. Id. art. 32.
30.
See id. art. 14(1)(a)-(b).
31.
Id. art. 7.
32.
See, e.g., Cour de cassation [Cass. le civ.] [highest court of ordinary
jurisdiction in France], Dec. 4, 1990, Soc. Coveco et autres c. Soc. Vesoul transports et
autre, 80 REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 1991, 558, 559 (holding that

though the court below erred in failing to consider Dutch law governing the contract,
thus violating the French civil code, French law should still be applied because neither
party invoked foreign law in their arguments); 1 DICEY & MORRIS, ON THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS 221,
9-003 (Lawrence Collins ed., 13th ed. 2000) (citing British law);
SCOLES ET AL., supra note 12, at 953 n.4 (citing American law).
33.
See, e.g., Cour de cassation [Cass. le civ] [highest court of ordinary
jurisdiction in France], Apr. 19, 1988, Roho c. Caron et autres, 78 REVUE CRITIQUE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIV9 1989, 68, 69 (holding that the application of French law
where the parties desired their controversy to be subject to French law was permissible
even though the choice contravened an international convention). The condition is that
the parties can freely dispose of the rights that are the subject of controversy.
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residing. 34 In the case of succession, the choice is mostly limited by
35
the citizenship and the domicile of the deceased.
Yet, more and more, parties are also allowed to choose legal
systems that have no connection to them or to the facts of their
dispute. That is the case in contract law disputes, the classic area in
which party autonomy applies. 36 The old rule was that the law
chosen by the parties must have some connection to the parties or the
case. 37 This rule has been replaced by the principle that parties are
allowed to choose the law of a state which has38 absolutely no
relationship whatever to either of them or to the case.
One particularly salient feature of party autonomy is that it
allows the parties to deselect even the mandatory rules of a legal
system. 39 Accordingly, the limits to party autonomy are not drawn by
mandatory law, but by public policy. Of course it is true that public
policy puts up some important restrictions. 40 But one could consider
the cases in which the selection of a law contravenes public policy as
being outside the scope of freedom of the parties. Within the field of

34.
See, e.g., Blirgerliches Gesetzbuch [German Civil Code], Aug. 18, 1896,
RGBI at 195, Annex 1, art. 15(2) (amended 1986).
Bundesgesetz vom 18. Dezember 1987 iiber das Internationale Privatrecht,
35.
[IPRG] [Swiss Private International Law Act], Dec. 18, 1987, SR 291, arts. 90(2), 91(2);
Civil Code of Qu6bec, S.Q., ch. 64, art. 3098(2); Italian Law No. 218 of May 31, 1995,
Gazz. Uff., June 3, 1995, art. 46(2). But see UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-703 (2004)
(failing to provide for such a limit).
See generally WILLIAM J. WOODWARD, JR., Contractual Choice of Law:
36.
Legislative Choice in an Era of PartyAutonomy, 54 SMU L. REV. 697 (2001) (explaining
the evolution of the choice-of-law doctrine in contracts).
37.
See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-105 (1989) (providing that the law chosen by the parties
must have some connection to the parties or the case, before revision of the U.C.C. in
2001). Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2) (1971)
(following the former U.C.C. rule, but only with relation to issues which the party could
not have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement), with id. § 187(1)
(allowing complete freedom of choice for other issues not covered by § 187(2) of the
Restatement). For a discussion of § 187(1), see infra text accompanying note 57.
See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-301(c) (2005) (providing a change from the old rule,
38.
which is explicitly motivated by "emerging international norms" according to the
Summary of Changes); Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to
International Contracts, art. 7, Mar. 17, 1994, O.A.S.T.S. No. 78, 33 I.L.M. 732;
European Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations art. 3, June
19, 1980 [hereinafter Rome Convention]; draft for an EC Parliament/Council
Regulation on the law applicable to contractual obligations [hereinafter Rome I
Regulation draft), art. 3. For a peculiar field of the law, see also UNIF. COMPUTER
INFORMATION TRANSACTIONS ACT (UCITA) § 109(a) (1999) (allowing the parties to
choose the law applicable to computer information transactions); on the act and the
cited provision, see WILLIAM J. WOODWARD, supra note 36 (discussing UCITA and the
revision of the U.C.C.).
39.
GERHARD KEGEL & KLAUS SCHURIG, supra note 1, at 654 (providing
examples of the extent of choice by parties); MAYER & HEUZft, supra note 1, at 516
(same); SCOLES ET AL., supra note 12, at 960-61 (same).
W. MULLER-FREIENFELS, Conflicts of Law and Constitutional Law, 45 U.
40.
CHI. L. REV. 589, 611 (1978) (noting policy interests that go into conflict-of-laws
decisions).
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party autonomy, the will of the individuals is unrestricted by
mandatory law.
Another important feature of party autonomy is that within its
realm, it trumps all other conflict rules. 41 Whether under a conflict
system a contract would be normally governed by the law of the state
in which the contractual obligations are to be fulfilled or by the law of
the state in which one of the parties has its domicile or seat does not
matter as long as the parties have made an explicit choice. 42 Party
autonomy thus prevails over other conflicts rules, which are
denigrated to mere default rules. Within its field, party autonomy is
the master.
The principle of party autonomy is so firmly entrenched in
today's law-making that it is even applied to the validity of the
choice-of-law clause itself. There are considerable logical arguments
against allowing the parties to "bootstrap" themselves and determine
the law that applies to their own choice-of-law clause. 43 Yet, such
freedom is explicitly recognized in European law. 44 This development
shows how important party autonomy has become to the legislator.
Instead of objectively determining the applicable law in case of doubt
regarding the validity of the choice-of-law clause, it defers to the
latter and presumes its validity.
In sum, it is no exaggeration to claim that party autonomy has
become the most important principle in conflict of laws. This is
underscored by the statement in the literature according to which
American courts have followed no other provision more than
Article 187 of the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws, which

41.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (using parties'

choice of governing law as a general principle).
42.
Id.
43.
0. KAHN-FREUND, GENERAL PROBLEMS OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
196 (1976) (criticizing the logical circle that is created by allowing the parties to choose
the law to which they are submitted); see also DeNicola v. Cunard Line Ltd., 642 F.2d
5, 7 n.2 (1st Cir. 1981) (noting that this would be "putting the barge before the tug').
44.
Under the Rome Convention, the existence and validity of the choice-of-law
clause is determined under the chosen law. ROME CONVENTION, supra note 38, arts.
3(4), 8(1). The Rome I Regulation, which will soon replace the Rome Convention,
provides for the same rule. ROME I REGULATION DRAFT, supra note 38, arts. 3(5), 10(1).
The interpretation of the Convention propounded here has widespread support among
European authors.
See, e.g., MARIO GIULIANO & PAUL LAGARDE, Report on the
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, art. 8, 1980 O.J. (C 282)
1 (EC); 1 DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 32, at 1222, 1232,
32-077, 32- 100, A different
interpreation is advocated by SCOLES ET AL., supra note 12, at 956 (stating that Article
3(4) refers the question of the validity of the choice-of-law clause to the lex causae (i.e.,
the law that would govern the contract in the absence of a choice-of-law agreement));
SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 325 (1998) (same).

Scoles et al.

ignore that Article 3(4) of the Rome Convention renders Article 8(1) applicable, which
requires one to purport that the contract, including its choice of law clause, would be
valid. This is a typical bootstrap rule.
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provides for the liberty of the parties to choose the applicable law. 45
Why then, it may be asked, does party autonomy take such a
marginal place in current conflicts doctrine? Why is the principle
that is most applied in practice not discussed much in theory? These
questions need to be addressed.
B. Theoretical Questions
Party autonomy has never been easily accepted on a theoretical
level. Joseph H. Beale, the author of the First Restatement of
Conflicts, ardently opposed the principle because he believed that
allowing the parties to choose the applicable law would give them
"permission to do a legislative act. '46 Freedom of choice of law would
practically make "a legislative body of any two persons who choose to
get together and contract. '47 Consequently, the First Restatement
did not include any provision recognizing such freedom. 48 The Second
Restatement took a sharp u-turn and claimed that Beale's view "is
now obsolete and in any event, falls off wide the mark. '4 9 It says that
party autonomy would be justified because it is the forum which
allows the parties, through its conflict rules, to determine the
applicable law. 50 But that leaves open why the conflict rules of the
forum should give such widespread powers to the parties. Does it not
thereby place them in a position above the law? Does it not give what
the French call "l'autonomie de la volont6," 51 autonomy of the will?
One possible answer to this question is that there would be a
general principle of freedom of contract which allows the parties to
choose the applicable legal system and which precedes national law.
This view is not as strange as it may seem at first glance. The
principle that the parties are free to enter into contracts and are
bound by their respective choices is so old that it is indeed a prime
candidate for a universal principle of law. For instance, Justice
Marshall called it a "universal principle of law" that "in every forum a
'52
contract is governed by the law with a view to which it was made.
One could also cite a famous provision of the French Civil Code which

45.
See SYMEONIDES ET AL., supranote 44, at 318 (stating that § 187 is followed
by more American courts than any other provision of the Restatement (Second));
SCOLES ETAL., supra note 12, at 980 (same).
46.
2 JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1080 (1935); see
also KAHN-FREUND, supra note 43 (taking a similar view).
47.
2 BEALE, supra note 46, at 1080.
48.
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 311-331 (1934).
49.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. e (1971).

50.
Id.
51.
See, e.g., KAHN-FREUND, supra note 43, at 195 (explaining the concept of
autonomy of will with regards to the parties); MAYER & HEUZE, supra note 1, at 511
(same).
52.
Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 48 (1825).
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recognizes that agreements have a binding force like laws. Article
1134(1) of the French Civil Code reads: "[a]greements lawfully
entered into take the place of the law for those who have made
53
them."
It is interesting to contrast this view with the one of Beale.
However, such a discussion would end up in a typical "chicken and
egg" problem: what came first, the freedom to enter into binding
agreements or the provision of state law that recognizes it? The
answer is troubling from a logical point of view. Also, a meta-legal
principle of freedom of choice of law is hard to reconcile with the
freedom the legislator has under the view of positivism to adopt any
law that it wants. 54 It is clear that the state remains free to restrict
55
this principle, at least in its own courts.
Another theory is that party autonomy means nothing more than
to allow the parties to incorporate the rules of law of a state into their
agreement. This view once prevailed on the continent 56 and has
influenced Article 187(1) of the Second Restatement, according to
which the parties can choose the rules of another legal system, but
only insofar as the rules of the otherwise applicable law allow them to
do so. 57 Under this so-called "incorporation theory," the rules of law
that the parties designate is of no importance. Indeed, they could as
well incorporate the standard terms and conditions of an industry's
association or legal rules that are not in force anywhere, like the
provisions of the Roman Twelve Tables. 58 But this theory downplays
the importance of party autonomy too much.59 Specifically, it does not
elucidate why under this principle the parties are free to deviate from

53.
C. CIV. art. 1134(1) (Fr.) ("Les conventions l6galement form~es tiennent lieu
de loi A ceux qui les ont faites."). A translation is available at the French Government
Official Web Page, http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr (follow "Les codes" British Flag
hyperlink; then follow "Civil Code" hyperlink; then search Article Number "1134") (last
visited Nov. 29, 2007).
54.

See FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, Contract Choice of Law in the Americas, 45 AM.

J. COMP. L. 195, 198 (1997) (describing the positivist perspective that the state rather
than the parties determines the applicable law).
55.

See

MATTHIAS

LEHMANN,

A

Plea for a

Transnational Approach to

Arbitrability in Arbitral Practice, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 753, 770-71 (2004)
(suggesting that a different view might be taken in an arbitral court).
56.

GEORGE MELCHIOR, DIE GRUNDLAGEN DES DEUTSCHEN INTERNATIONALEN

PRIVATRECHTS 500 (1932) (arguing that the parties' choice of a foreign law would have
the same effects as an incorporation of any rule by reference); see also KAHN-FREUND,
supra note 43 (same).
57.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(1) cmt. c (1971)

(stating that the rule provides for incorporation designated by the parties and is not a
rule of choice of law).
58.

See PIERRE MAYER, TRANSNATIONAL RULES IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL

ARBITRATION 44 (Int'l Chamber of Commerce ed., 1993) (providing a provocative
remark).
59.
See also 1 DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 32, at 1226-27, $ 32-086, -088
(describing the difference between referring to foreign law as a choice of law and
incorporating provisions of a foreign law into the contract).
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even mandatory rules of the otherwise applicable law. Moreover, it
cannot explain why party autonomy is a conflict-of-laws rule at all.
For instance, the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws underlines
that Article 187(1) "is a rule providing for incorporation by reference
and is not a rule of choice of law. 60° However, if that is true, why is
this provision included in a Restatement that, according to its very
title, treats the "Conflict of Laws"?
A different opinion strives to avoid any radical solution, neither
recognizing complete freedom to choose the applicable law nor
denying the existence of party autonomy. It views the will of the
parties as an element that helps to "localize" the contract within a
specific legal system. 61 Although most of the time party autonomy
prevails, there might be other factors as well which mandate a
different localization than the one preferred by the parties. This
approach has the advantage of bringing party autonomy into line
with classic conflict-of-laws theory. The problem, however, is that the
approach cannot explain why it is increasingly accepted in legislation
that the parties can even choose a legal system that has no
connection whatsoever to the dispute. 62 To say that they would
"localize" their contract in thege cases is a mere fiction.
Finally, a very common theory holds that the principle of party
autonomy protects the reasonable expectations of the parties. 63 This
theory correctly assumes that the parties have a vital interest in the
outcome of the choice-of-law process. To cure any uncertainties about
the applicable law, the theory proposes that parties should determine
themselves the law that they want to be applied. 64 But the argument
is circular: if the parties were not allowed to choose the applicable
law, then they could not expect their agreement to be taken into
consideration. They would therefore have no "reasonable expectation" that the law chosen by them would be applied. Moreover,
predictability could be secured in ways other than by party autonomy.
For instance, if courts all over the world adopted the same choice-oflaw rules, parties would also be able to predict which law would be

60.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(1) cmt. c (1971).

61.
HENRY BATIFFOL, Subjectivisme et Objectivisme dans le droit international
privi des contrats [Subjectivism and Objectivism in the Private International Law of
Contracts], in I M9LANGES OFFERTS A JACQUES MAURY 39, 53 (1960).

62.
See supra note 38.
63.
See, e.g., EDITH FRIEDLER, Party Autonomy Revisited: A Statutory Solution
to a Choice-of-Law Problem, 37 U. KAN. L. REV. 471 (1989); ROBERT A. LEFLAR, ChoiceInfluencing Considerationsin Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 283 (1966); AMOS
SHAPIRA, Territorialism, National Parochialism, Universalism and Party Autonomy:
How Does One Square the Choice-of-Law Circle?, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 199, 203 (2000);
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. e (stressing the need
for predictability); WEINTRAUB, supra note 4, at 449 (same).

64.
LEFLAR, supra note 63, at 282-83 (arguing that a rule permitting parties to
select the state whose law is to govern their transaction would protect the justified
expections of the parties).
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applied to their dispute. The applicable law would even be more
predictable for two reasons. First, choice-of-law clauses are often
subject to questions about their validity. 65 Second, the law that
objectively applies to the contract could not be trumped in some cases
by an agreement between the parties. The theory which nevertheless
favors party autonomy as a means to secure predictability is of course
based on the experience that states are unable to agree on uniform
choice-of-law rules. 66 But it does not provide an explanation why it is
easier for states to accept the parties' freedom of choice of law than to
agree on universal rules on conflicts. Finally, it is far from clear why
the need for predictability should allow the parties to deviate from
even mandatory laws. 67 States do not ordinarily allow parties to
contract out of their mandatory rules just to make their private
68
relations more stable.
There might be other possible justifications for party autonomy.
For instance, one could argue that states would not expect to forgo
anything in the process of individual choice of law because their law
would be chosen as often as the law of other states. The idea is to
view party autonomy as a kind of lottery in which one state's law has
an equal chance to be chosen as another's. Yet, such an assumption
is wrong. Parties have clear preferences for certain laws.6 9 For
example, it is well known that in financial transactions choice-of-law
clauses regularly point to English law or the law of New York as the
applicable rules of law. 70 In international arbitration, the laws of the
United Kingdom, Switzerland, and France enjoy notorious
popularity. 71 In international maritime and insurance transactions,
parties have a tendency to choose English law. 72 Thus, some states
necessarily "lose" in the process of individual choice of law, provided
that one perceives non-application of their law as a disadvantage.

65.
See FRIEDLER, supra note 63, at 472-73 (noting that critics of party
autonomy in choice-of-law provisions have raised the issue of validity of the
agreement).
66.
LEFIAR, supra note 63, at 286 (noting that concerns with claims to
sovereignty enter into international choice of law).
67.
See KRAMER, supra note 4, at 330 (arguing that the state has no reason to
make the parties' choice broader than the conflicting laws); see also WEINTRAUB, supra
note 4, at 449 (voicing similar doubts).
68.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. d (stating
that formal contract requirements still apply regardless of choice of law provisions).
69.
See LEFLAR, supra note 63, at 282-83 (arguing that parties have a critical
interest in the law that is applied to their contractual provisions).
70.
See, e.g., KIMMO METTALA, Governing-Law Clauses of Loan Agreements in
InternationalProject Financing,20 INT'L LAW. 219, 222 (1986) (describing choice of law
provisions regularly applied to financial transactions).
71.
See DAN C. HULEA, Contracting to Expand the Scope of Review of Foreign
Arbitral Awards: An American Perspective, 29 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 313, 347 (2003)

(describing choice-of-law provisions regularly applied in international arbitration).
72.
See 1 DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 32, at 1218-19,
32-063 (noting that
English law has gained worldwide acceptance in insurance and maritime contracts).
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Consequently, it needs to be explained why states would agree to
such a process.
Maybe the states' common interest in international trade and
commerce could be a reason. One could argue that states would
honor freely negotiated choice-of-law clauses in order to secure the
conditions necessary for the functioning of international commerce,
which benefits them even if at times their law is not applied. There
are some indications for this view in U.S. case law. 73 However, this
argument would not explain why the parties are given freedom to
choose the applicable law even in areas that have no connection at all
74
to trade and commerce, like marriage or tort law.
Given all the difficulties to justify party autonomy as a legal
principle, an important German conflicts scholar has described party
autonomy as a "stopgap," which applies simply because one would
have no other satisfactory conflicts rule to govern. 75 That is, indeed,
an open admission of failure. How can the conflicts rule most
accepted all over the world be a mere "stopgap"? Should the principle
which trumps all other conflicts rules be nothing more than a
makeshift? The wonder with which experienced theorists react to
party autonomy reflects the fact that there is something deeply wrong
with current conflicts theory; it is simply not able to account for the
fundamental principle that is most frequently used to solve conflicts
in practice.
C. PracticalQuestions
As indicated earlier, to justify party autonomy is not merely of
theoretical interest; it is also relevant for a number of important
questions in practice.

73.

See M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972):

The expansion of American business and industry will hardly be encouraged if,
notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a parochial concept that all
disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our courts ....
We cannot
have trade and commerce in world markets and international waters
exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts.
Although Zapata concerned the validity of a choice-of-forum clause in favor of the
English courts, its holding also affects choice of law since the Supreme Court concluded
that the English courts would interpret the choice of the English forum as a choice of
English law and nevertheless upheld the clause. See Zapata, 407 U.S. at 13 n.15
(supporting the validity of choice-of-law clauses). On the application of Zapata to choice
of law, see also Allen v. Lloyd's of London, 94 F.3d 923, 928 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing
Zapata for the validity of choice-of-law clauses); Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d
1353, 1362 (2d Cir. 1993) (same); Bison Pulp & Paper Ltd. v. MIV Pergamos, No. 89
Civ. 1392, 1995 WL 880775 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 1995) (same).
74.
See discussion supra Part II.A.
75.

GERHARD

KEGEL, INTERNATIONALES

PRIVATRECHT

208

(1st ed.

1960)

(calling party autonomy a "stopgap solution" to the conflict-of-laws problem); see also
KEGEL & SCHURIG, supra note 1, at 653 (same).
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First, the scope of the choice of law: does it also include the
mandatory rules of the chosen law? This is a question of paramount
practical interest.
Do parties have to take into account the
mandatory laws of the chosen legal system or can they just exclude
those provisions since they would not be applicable otherwise? And if
so, are parties presumed to have excluded the mandatory rules or
not?
There are no easy answers to these questions. An old theory
held that the chosen law applies in toto, including its mandatory
provisions. 76 Yet, one may have an uncomfortable feeling if, for
instance, Swiss antitrust law should apply to a sales contract between
a U.S. company and a German company simply because the parties
chose to submit their agreement to the law of Switzerland. This
uncomfortable feeling stems from the fact that mandatory law is
normally applicable irrespective of the will of the parties. Mandatory
law, it seems, is therefore outside of the realm of party autonomy. On
the other hand, it appears inevitable that the parties must be subject
to some mandatory rules. If they were free to deselect the otherwise
applicable law and at the same time did not need to include the
mandatory rules of the chosen law, they could avoid mandatory rules
altogether.
A related question is whether the parties are forced to choose
any applicable law at all. Since they are absolutely free to determine
the rules to be applied, it is not at all evident that they need to choose
a legal system of a particular state. One could also imagine that they
would be able to write a sort of self-sufficing contract, a "contract
without a law,"77 or that they could resort to some rules not made by
8
the state, like a "new law merchant" or lex mercatoria7
Another question is what happens if the parties choose a law
under which their contract, or part of it, is invalid. 79 Since the

76.
See KEGEL & SCHURIG, supra note 1, at 155; ANTON K. SCHNYDER,
WIRTSCHAFTSKOLLISIONSRECHT 248-55 (1990).
But see SCHNYDER, id., at 255-60
(criticizing this approach).
77.
See MAYER & HEUZt, supra note 1, at 514 (citing the French theory of the
"contrat sans loi").
78.
From the rich literature on the subject, see, for example, KLAUS P. BERGER,
THE CREEPING CODIFICATION OF THE LEX MERCATORIA (1998); BERTHOLD GOLDMAN,
9 FRONTIERES DU DROIT ET LEX MERCATORIA, ARCHIVES DE LA PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT
177 (1964); FILLIP DE LY, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW AND LEX MERCATORIA, 1992;

CLIVE M. SCHMITTHOFF, International Business Law: A New Law Merchant, in 2
CURRENT LAW & SOCIAL PROBLEMS 128-53 (1961); URSULA STEIN, LEX MERCATORIAREALITAT UND THEORIE (1994); FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, Lex Mercatoria and Private

InternationalLaw, 60 LA. L. REV. 1133 (2000).
79.
Cases in which the parties have chosen a law that invalidates their
contract or a contractual clause are legend. See, e.g., Milanovich v. Costa Crociere,
S.p.A., 954 F.2d 763, 769 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (invalidating a clause in a cruise ticket under
the Italian law whose applicability was stipulated in the ticket); Moyer v. Citicorp
Homeowners Inc., 799 F.2d 1445, 1451-52 (11th Cir. 1986) (invalidating an interest
rate clause under a usury law of Georgia because Georgia law had been chosen);
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invalidity of a contract is always based on mandatory law, this
question is related to the first. However, it is not identical to the first
question because not all mandatory rules have the effect of making
an agreement invalid. If the contract is invalid under the chosen law,
we are facing a paradox: the chosen law applies because the parties
want it to apply; at the same time, the application of the chosen law
contradicts the parties' intentions because by the very fact of
contracting, they have shown that they want to be contractually
bound. One could argue, of course, that the chosen law applies only
to the extent that it upholds the contract.80 But this seems to imply a
backlash on the parties' autonomy. Thus, rules on party autonomy
have been criticized as going either "too far or not far enough"
because they would sometimes point to a law that invalidates the
the contract valid
intended contract, and sometimes renders
81
irrespective of any mandatory rules of law.
A further question raised by party autonomy is whether the
parties can split up the applicable law: are they allowed to submit
some aspects of their relationship to the law of state A, others to the
law of state B, and maybe still others to the law of state C? This
problem is known under the French term d~pegage.8 2 The validity of
such choice-of-law clauses is doubtful if one sees the legal system as a
unity that applies as a whole. Under such a view, parties could
submit their agreement either to the law of state A, or B, or C, but
not to a patchwork of the rules of these states.
Still another question is whether the parties are allowed to agree
on so-called "alternative" or "floating" choice-of-law clauses. Under
such a clause, the parties leave the applicable law open and it will be
chosen at a later point in time.83 The validity of these clauses is
subject to serious doubt, for the later choice may create considerable
problems in interpreting and constructing the agreement. Moreover,
an alternative or floating choice-of-law clause leaves unanswered the

Boatland, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 558 F.2d 818, 823 (6th Cir. 1977) (holding a
termination clause in a dealership contract to be without legal effect on the basis of
Wisconsin law chosen by the parties).
80.
This is the so-called rule of validation. See infra note 247.
81.
See WEINTRAUB, supra note 4 (stating "party autonomy rules either go too
far or not far enough."); see infra Part V.A (providing a discussion of this statement).
32-046 to 32-052
See 1 DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 32, at 1211-14,
82.
(discussing the problem of splitting, or carving up, the applicable law); WILLIS L.M.
REESE, Dpegage: A Common Phenomenon in Choice of Law, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 58
(1973) (discussing ddpeqage in general).
32-084 (discussing
83.
See 1 DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 32, at 1225-26,
clauses that leave the applicable law open until a later point in time); SCOLES ET AL.,
supra note 12, at 951-52 (same).
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question of which law is applicable at the time the agreement is
84
made.
A final question concerns the "petrifaction" or "freeze" of the
applicable law: does the chosen law apply as it was when the parties
entered into the choice-of-law clause, or do later changes affect the
law's application?8 5 The problem is especially relevant with regard to
contracts between private individuals and states, so called "state
contracts". In such contracts, stabilization clauses have been inserted
to prevent the effects of a unilateral change of the applicable rules by
the state party.8 6 Problems can also arise in private or commercial
relationships, however.8 7 The solution seems to depend on the
rationale for applying the chosen law-do we apply it because it is a
choice made by the parties, or because it properly falls under the
authority of the rule maker?
Current conflicts theories leave us with no answers to these
questions; only with a robust theory of party autonomy can we hope
to find a solution. Accordingly, this Article will not try to devise any
easy answers to the specified problems. Instead, it will analyze why
current theories have such difficulty in addressing the questions
raised here. What makes it so hard to come to terms with party
autonomy? Why is it so difficult to ascertain the practical effects of a
private choice of law? In order to answer these questions, it is
necessary to go back to the very basics of conflicts. We will see that
the problems raised are all the product of a particular attitude
towards choice of law, one that focuses exclusively on conflicts
between states and not on conflicts between private parties.

84.
See, e.g., Armar Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Caisse Alg~rienne d'Assurance et de
Reassurance, [1981] 1 W.L.R. 207, 216 (Eng.) ("[T]here must be a proper law of any
contract-a governing law-at the time of the making of the contract.").
32-088 (discussing
See, e.g., 1 DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 32, at 1227,
85.
the "freeze" of the applicable law).
See GEORGES R. DELAUME, The Myth of the Lex Mercatoria and State
86.
Contracts, in LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION 77, 94-96 (Thomas E. Carbonneau
ed., 1990) (explaining the use of stabilization clauses); WOLFGANG PETER, ARBITRATION
AND RENEGOTIATION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 214-30 (1995)

(same); WOLFGANG PETER, Stabilization Clauses in State Contracts, INT'L Bus. L.J.
875-91 (1998) (same).

87.

See, e.g., HEINER BRAUN, ProtectingForeign Investments in the Palestinian

Autonomous Territories, in NEW POLITICAL ENTITIES IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 321, 329 (Amos Shapira & Mala Tabory eds., 1999) (explaining

private parties' use of freezing clauses in contracts).
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OF THE STATE-CENTERED PERSPECTIVE OF CONFLICTS
THEORY

A. The Notion of Conflict of Laws
All conflict theories share a common characteristic: they are built
around the notion of the state.8 8 This tendency is reflected in the
name of the field. Indeed, the expression "conflict of laws" creates the
impression of a struggle or battle between different states over the
application of their laws. It has been rightly called a "war like
expression."8 9 Finding rules for "conflicts" seems similar to the
attempt to solve controversies between states peacefully.90
Governmental interest analysis has tried to appease the tension
between rule makers by eliminating "false conflicts."9 1 However, a
number of "true conflicts" remain in which the battle is fought even
harder; what counts in those cases, like in war, is only the allegiance
92
to one or the other power.
The term "conflict of laws" is therefore clearly impregnated by
ideas of state relations. This is also true for the name the discipline
carries in most other countries of the world: "private international
law."9 3 The notion reminds us of international law. Inter-national
law, by its very concept, deals only with relationships between states,
94
although there is a modern trend to include private actors as well.

88.
See, e.g., DELAUME, supra note 86, at 94-96 (advocating different theories
that center around the role of the state); PETER, supra note 86, at 875-91 (same);
SYMEONIDES, supra note 11, Part I (same).
89.
See 2 BEALE, supra note 46, at 15 (citing COMTE DE VAREILLES-SOMMIERE,
LA SYNTHESE DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE (1897)).
90.
French authors have often described the object of conflict of laws as
"conflits de souverain~t6" or conflicts of sovereignty. See, e.g., ANTOINE PILLET,
PRINCIPES DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 67 (1903). The same author thinks that
courts would miss the respect of a foreign sovereign if they would not apply its law to
its nationals. See id. at 275. Another French author has described the goal of private
international law as being to separate sovereign powers. J.-P. NIBOYET, I TRAITE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVt FRANcAJS 79 (1938).
91.
See CURRIE, supra note 2, at 107, 163, 189 (discussing cases involving "no
real problem" because all potentially applicable systems lead to the same result); see
also BRAINERD CURRIE, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson-A Recent Development in
Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1233, 1242 (1963) (suggesting that instead of the
false problems the real problems should be addressed).
92.
See CURRIE, supra note 2, at 190 (arguing that in a true conflict a court has
to follow the interests of its own state in the first place).
93.
Also known as "Derecho internacional privado," "Droit international priv6,"
"Internationales Privatrecht," "Diritto internazionale privato," or 'Wishpat Ben-Leumi
Pratee."
94.
On the role of the private individual as a subject of international law, see
infra note 195. See also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004) ("A
related consideration is whether international law extends the scope of liability for a
violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private
actor such as a corporation or individual.").
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It is also sometimes called public international law, in order to
distinguish it from private international law. 95 The parallel names
create a strong tendency to view private international law as the little
brother of public international law, in which its principles are applied
to private relationships. Indeed, this is the approach that has often
been followed. 96 Joseph Story, who subscribed to the term "private
international law,"9 7 made "sovereignty" of the state over a territory
the premise of his conflicts theory. 98 He started from the "natural
principle" that the laws of one country can have no force in the
territory of another, a principle he derived from the equality and
independence of nations. 99 Savigny also agreed with the assumption
that no state can require the recognition of its law beyond its
boundaries.' 0 0 But because he thought it would afford little help to
solve the problem of a conflict between different legal systems, he
based his theory instead on an "international common law of nations
having intercourse with one another."''1 1
This is international law talk.
Principles analogous to
international law, like state sovereignty or a common law of nations,
are employed in conflict of laws. State relations are considered to be
more important than private relations and therefore are superposed
to them. 10 2 Although it is recognized today that international law
and conflict of laws are fundamentally different disciplines, 0 3 the
term "private international law" is more than a simple misnomer.
"Name exacts thought," one could paraphrase Currie.10 4 Given the

95.

See, e.g., SCOLES ET AL., supra note 12, at 2 ("In contrast, public-law

disputes of an international character, such as those between sovereign countries or
other international-law persons, fall within the scope of the 'law of nations' or 'Public
International Law."').
96.

See

1

LASSA

OPPENHEIM,

INTERNATIONAL

LAW:

A

TREATISE

6-7

(H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1995) (arguing that private international law is connected
to public international law).
97.

1834).
98.
99.

JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 9 (1st ed.

Id. §§ 18-19, 21.
Id. §§ 7-8.

SAVIGNY, supra note 1, § 348.
101.
Id. Although Savigny is rightly credited to have marked the "Copernican"
turn from the conflicts between sovereigns toward the "community of law," his ideas
are heavily influenced by concepts taken from public international law. See, e.g.,
FERNANDEZ RozAs & SANCHEZ LORENZO, supra note 1, at 44-45. For instance, he uses
the term 'local limits of the authority of the rules of law over the legal relations" to
describe the problem of conflicts, thereby following a typical internationalist approach.
See SAVIGNY, supranote 1, ch. 1 (discussing local limits to the authority of legal rules).
100.

102.

See, e.g., MARCEL CALEB, LE PRINCIPE DE L'AUTONOMIE DE LA VOLONT9 EN

DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 55 (1926) (arguing that every conflict of laws is paralleled
by a conflict of sovereignty).
103.
2 BEALE, supra note 46, at 14; JAN KROPHOLLER, INTERNATIONALES
PRIVATRECHT 7 (5th ed. 2004).

104.
at 117.

"As in many other instances, form exacts thought." CURRIE, supra note 2,
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parallel nomenclature, one does not need to wonder why many
attempts have been made in history to transfer the concepts from
international law to conflict of laws. 105 Still, most of the literature
employs terms such as "state territory," "state interests," and "rights"
in order to deal with private relations that exceed the boundaries of
106
one state.
Now, you might ask, what is wrong with that? Does not the very
question of conflicts arise only because we have to choose between
different legal regimes? 0 7 And are not states the authors of these
regimes? Hence, does it not follow that the applicable law must
necessarily be determined by linking the case to one or another of
these states?
These objections are of course not unfounded. Indeed, it is
helpful, and in many areas necessary, to consider which state is the
author of a rule in order to determine the latter's scope of application.
For instance, it makes sense to think about which state adopted a
traffic rule in order to know in which territory it applies. On the
other hand, if one is constantly to link the applicable law to the power
or interests of its author, one cannot explain party autonomy. If
every set of facts would be objectively attributed to the authority of
one state and its rules, there would be no room for the will of private
individuals selecting between different legal systems.
Viewing
conflicts as battles between states is therefore not wrong. If done
exclusively, however, it closes the mind to the role of the individual.
Thus, the very notion of "conflict of laws" prevents us to see why
parties may select the applicable law. Only if we overcome the statecentered perspective, we will be able to embrace party autonomy.
B. When do Conflicts Arise?
The idea that conflict of laws is a battle between states over the
application of their laws has another ramification. This ramification
is the modern trend in the conflicts literature that extends the field to
all sorts of questions.
Conflicts of laws are seen as arising
everywhere, not only in private law, but in public law and criminal
law as well. Increasingly, authors work in new fields, such as conflict

105.
See, e.g., ANTOINE PILLET, I TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PRIVE 21 (1923); 1 ERNST ZITELMANN, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 71 (1897). On

the tendency in Spanish law to use the notion "sovereignty" to link the two fields, see
FERNANDEZ RoZAS & SANCHEZ LORENZO, supra note 1, at 46. For a modern attempt to
link international law and conflict of laws, see PASCAL DE VAREILLE-SOMMIERES, LA
COMPETENCE INTERNATIONALE DE L'ETAT EN MATIERE DE DROIT PRIVt, (1997).

106.

See infra Part III.D.

107.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1 (1971) ('The world is

composed of territorial states having separate and differing systems of law. Events
and transactions occur, and issues arise, that may have a significant relationship to
more than one state. . . ").
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of criminal laws or conflict of administrative laws.108
These
"discoveries" are a direct consequence of the conception of conflict of
laws as a battle between states. If one adopts this idea, conflicts can
indeed not be limited to private law, because there is no reason why
states should not fight about the application of their public and
criminal law as well. Accordingly, the subject of conflict of laws is a
universal problem. Every single case in the world would be preceded
by the question: which law should be applied?
Of course, one cannot deny that such a view of conflict of laws is
possible. But one must fear that it loses sight of the peculiarity of
private international law. Conflict of laws in the traditional sense
concerns only very specific circumstances. It applies when the parties
to a dispute are private individuals, and when they are litigating over
private law questions. 10 9
To understand the particularity of this situation, it is useful to
contrast it to others. For instance, in a dispute between a citizen and
an administrative agency such as the SEC, the court has no choice
which law it will apply. 110 It always has to follow the law of its own
state."'
Similarly, a criminal court is not free to choose the
applicable law. 112 It has to enforce the law of a certain state, its own
state. 113 A constitutional court also has no choice but to apply the
114
constitution of the state by which it was established.
Of course, a foreign element can be involved in those cases as
well. For instance, under the active personality principle, states can
pursue crimes committed by their citizens in other states. 115 In this
context, the judge might face a question of how far he or she should
apply the national law, especially in light of the fact that other states
(i.e., the state where the crime was committed) might also have an
interest in applying their law to the case. Moreover, some legal
systems specifically require the judge to take account of the

108.
See, e.g., CARLOS ALBERTO ALCORTA, I PRINCIPIOS DE DERECHO PENAL
INTERNACIONAL (1931); DIETRICH OEHLER, INTERNATIONALES STRAFRECHT (2d ed.
1983); EDWARD S. STIMSON, CONFLICT OF CRIMINAL LAWS (1936); MILENA STERIO, The

Globalization Era and the Conflict of Laws: What Europe Could Learn from the United
States and Vice Versa, 13 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 161, 178 (2005) (discussing
conflicts of public law regulations). Probably the earliest attempt to formulate conflict
rules for administrative laws was completed by Karl Neumeyer. See KARL NEUMEYER,
INTERNATIONALES VERWALTUNGSRECHT (1910).

109.
See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 12, at 2 (underlining that the word "private"
in "private international law" signifies that only private-law disputes fall within the
scope of conflict of laws).
110.

See

RESTATEMENT

(FIRST) OF CONFLICT

OF LAWS

§§ 311-331

(1934)

(missing a provision allowing parties to choose the governing law).
111.
Id.
112.

See RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971) (failing to

address conflict of laws with respect to criminal cases).
113.
Id. (failing to address conflict of laws with respect to criminal cases).
114.
Id. (failing to address conflict of laws with respect to state constitutions).
115.

See, e.g., OEHLER, supra note 108, at 70-71.
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punishability or the sanction provided under foreign law when
determining the sentence.
In reality, legal regimes overlap in many areas and the scope of
application of a particular national law is an issue that arises
frequently. 116 But the typical conflicts question is different. It is not
a question of how far we should extend our own law or whether we
should take other laws into consideration. Rather, it is a question of
whether the judge should apply the law of state X or state Y in the
first place.
This is a totally different perspective. In private law situations a
"choice of law" is possible, a term that has therefore been used to
designate the whole field of conflict of laws. 1 17 A "choice" over the
applicable law exists only in private law situations, for two kinds of
persons: the parties, or a judge. The freedom to choose the applicable
law is typical for private law, because when a private dispute
presents foreign elements, it is conceivable to apply a law other than
the law of the forum. In contrast, questions of the applicable legal
system are rarely relevant in the context of public and criminal law.
The peculiarity of the private law situation is further illuminated
by another term used to describe the problem of conflict of laws, the
"transient cause of action." A transient cause of action is one that
may be prosecuted anywhere and any court can examine it, provided
its conditions for jurisdiction are fulfilled. 118 In contrast, a "local"
cause of action can only be brought to a certain local law court or
agency, which will pursue it under its own law. 119 Paradigmatic
examples of local causes of actions are crimes and claims of a publiclaw nature. The transient cause of action, on the other hand, is a
typical private law claim. It may be subjected to the same law
irrespective of the tribunal that is deciding on it. Indeed, the
application of the same law independently of the competent tribunal
is a major, if not the major goal of conflict-of-laws theory. One way to
ensure it is to follow the principle of party autonomy.

That is why it would be too shortsighted to define the problem of conflict as
116.
one of drawing lines between the spheres of application of different national laws. Yet,
this view is defended by some authors. See, e.g., VAREILLE-SOMMI9RES, supra note
105, at 19-107 (claiming that the subject of conflict of laws would be to determine the
frontiers between different national laws, i.e. conflict of laws would be a "Grenzrecht").
117.

See, e.g., FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE

(spec. ed. 2005) (using the term "choice of law" as the title of a book on conflict of laws).
CURRIE, supra note 2, at 316; see also Slater v. Mexican Nat'l Ry. Co., 194
118.
U.S. 120, 126 (1904) (using the expression "the theory of foreign suit").
See CURRIE, supra note 2, at 312 ("[Blecause of the history and forms of the
119.
common law, there are certain actions that are safely brought only in a particular
locality. These are called local actions .... ").
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C. Why Do We Apply ForeignLaw?
The foregoing raises the problem why judges and parties have a
choice over the applicable law in private law cases. By phrasing the
question in a slightly different way, the question becomes one that is
often discussed in conflicts theory: Why do we apply foreign law?
The proponents of the battle-of-states theory can give an easy
answer to this question is: because the legislature says so. For them,
the judge of state A applies the law of state B only if the legislator of
state A has told him or her to do so. In the legal war between
nations, the legislator defines both the power and the limits of its
judges' ability to apply foreign law. This view is in line with
positivism, which sees law as a command by the lawgiver. 120 If a
judge is an organ of the state-and there seems to be no doubt about
that-he or she can apply foreign law only because the lawgiver has
said to do so. Each lawgiver therefore determines which law the
judge will apply. This is the reason why each state has its own
conflict-of-laws rules.
The positivist view can, of course, hardly be attacked from the
normative viewpoint. However, a challenge comes from a historical
perspective: when courts began to apply the law of other states they
were not statutorily mandated to do so. Major impulses to the
application of foreign law did not come from the legislature, but from
science. 12 1 The starting point of modern conflict of laws seems to
have been a comment to the Codex Iustiniani by the Glossator
Bartolus. 122 Through writers like Savigny and Story, the application
of foreign law became a basic tenet of judicial practice. 123 In contrast,
124
conflict of laws has never been an area of legislative hyper-activity.
Indeed, legislation and choice of law have often been described in
"antithetical terms."'1 25 Even in countries which tend to codify every

120.

See, e.g., JOHN AUSTIN, Lectures on Jurisprudence: The Philosophy of Law

15 (1875).

121.
See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 12, at 18 (stating that the first American
cases cited Ulrich Huber's ideas on comity and Joseph Story's Commentaries on the
Conflict of laws).
122.

JUENGER, supra note 117, at 11; SCOLES ET AL., supra note 12, at 10. Yet,

there is also evidence for much earlier conflicts solutions. See JUENGER, supra note
117, at 10 (citing examples from Greek Antiquity); SCOLES ET AL., supra note 12, at 9
(same).
123.
SCOLES ET AL., supra note 12, at 16-19.
124.
(1977).

ROBERT A. LEFLAR, Choice-of-Law Statutes, 44 TENN. L. REV. 951, 951

125.
SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, American Choice of Law at the Dawn of the 21st
Century, 37 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 79 (2001); see also CURRIE, supra note 2, at 84
('Most likely, the reply would be that such questions belong to the realm of conflict of
laws, and are for the courts to determine ....
It simply means, in this case, that the
legislature has not thought about the matter, and does not want to think about it.").
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area of the law, conflicts situations are often not exhaustively
126
regulated.
But regardless of whether it is the judge or the legislator that is
responsible for the application of foreign law, one fundamental
problem remains: why does one state apply the law of another at all?
Two answers have routinely been given.
The first is comity of nations: foreign law is applied for purposes
of "being nice" to other states. This attitude is grounded in the
mutual interest of the states in having commercial and other contacts
with each other, a view to which both Story and Savigny
subscribed. 127 In this regard, they relied on the opinion of the Dutch
Jurist Ulrich Huber. 128 Huber explained that the laws of a nation
have force only within the limits of a government; therefore, they
could apply not out of right in another state, but only by its
courtesy. 129 Although the comity theory dates back to the 17th
century, it continues to be relevant. Comity has been cited in U.S.
case law as the reason for applying other laws. 130 Moreover, it
underlies requirements of reciprocity in the application of foreign law,
the recognition of foreign judgments, 131 and also such modern
132
approaches as the governmental interest analysis.
Again, this view superimposes state-relations over private
relationships. What counts is only the gesture towards the other
sovereign. While we are not bound to apply another state's law, we

126.
See, for instance, French law.
127.
See SAVIGNY, supra note 1, § 348; STORY, supra note 977, § 38.
128.
ULRICH HUBER, DE CONFLICTU LEGUM IN DIVERSIS IMPERIIS, reprinted in
SAVIGNY, supra note 1, app. IV. Huber, in turn, could draw on the work of PAUL VOET,
DE STATUIS EORUMQUE CONCURSU, sec. IV cap. II no. 17, reprinted in SAVIGNY, supra
note 1, app. III, who also used the term "comity" (mores comiter).
129.
The first and the third of Huber's three maxims are translated in Emory v.
Grenough, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 369, 370 (1797).
130.
See, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895) ("The extent to which
the law of one nation .. . shall be allowed to operate within the dominion of another
nation, depends upon what our greatest jurists have been content to call 'the comity of
nations."'); Huntington v. Atrill, 146 U.S. 657, 669 (1892) ("Laws have no force of
themselves beyond the jurisdiction of the state which enacts them, and can have
extraterritorial effect only by the comity of other states."); J. Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. v.
Grindlays Bank (Uganda) Ltd., 333 N.E.2d 168, 173 (N.Y. 1975) ("Laws of foreign
governments have extraterritorial jurisdiction only by comity.").
131.
See, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 16 S.Ct. 139 (1895) (refusing the
enforcement of a French judgment for want of reciprocity). On the continuing
importance of reciprocity in the recognition of judgments, see JOHN A. SPANOGLE, The
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in the U.S.-A Matter of State Law in Federal
Courts, 13 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 85, 92-93 (2005). However, requirements of reciprocity are
generally in retreat. See id. (noting that negative reciprocity is much more common
now and that the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
drafted legislation to reduce requirements of reciprocity).
132.
See CURRIE, supra note 2, at 184 ("Foreign law would be applied only when
the court has determined that the foreign state has a legitimate interest in the
application of its law and policy to the case at bar and that the forum has none.").
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do it for the sake of good relations with the other country. We want
to have "peace" with the others, therefore we respect their legal
system.
But is the relationship with other states really the reason why
we apply its law? There are certainly areas where concern for
bilateral relations and cooperation with other states influences the
choice-of-law process. One example is when a court applies the
provisions of another state on public policy issues. This situation is
special because it touches upon basic interests of the foreign state
that necessitate such a policy weighing. 133 However, it has been
argued that a state would take a considerable interest in other
private cases as well, as exemplified by the fact that states sometimes
file amicus curiae briefs in private litigation. 134 Indeed, one may
think of only one interest that a foreign state might have in such
cases: an interest in having one of its citizens prevail. Precisely for
that reason we should ask ourselves whether it is wise to pay
deference to the state's demand for the application of its law. Should
the law not be something more neutral or more independent of the
rule maker? How can we accept that a legislator takes the side of one
party in litigation? Paradoxically, in many cases it is exactly the
special interest of a state in the outcome of litigation that should lead
us to disregard its plea for application of its law.
Another way to justify the application of another state's law is to
think of foreign law as fact. This view was mainly developed in
procedural law because in many countries the judge informs himself
about foreign law as he would about questions of fact. 135 However,
this approach also has an effect on the choice of the applicable law
itself. The theory of vested rights is based on the idea that rights are
facts that are created in other countries and therefore have to be
respected as such by the forum. 136 The theory has influenced both

133.
See ROME CONVENTION, supra note 38, art. 7(1) ("In considering whether to
give effect to these mandatory rules, regard shall be had to their nature and purpose
and to the consequences of their application or non-application."); Bundesgesetz vom
18. Dezember 1987 iiber das Internationale Privatrecht [IPRG] [Swiss Private
International Law Act], Dec. 18, 1987, SR 291, art. 19 (allowing the application of
foreign mandatory law if required by the interests of one party that are worthy of
protection and outweigh the interests of the other side).
134.
See SYMEONIDES, supra note 12525, at 21-22 (pointing to the possibility for
a state to file an amicus brief in a private-law dispute using the example of Hartford
Fire Insurance Co. v. California(citation omitted)).
135.
See, e.g., Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187, 236 (1804) ("Foreign
laws are well understood to be facts which must, like other facts, be proved to exist
before they can be received in a court of justice."). This theory was overcome by Rule
44.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However, it is still followed in other
countries. See Zivilprozef3ordnung [German civil procedure statute], Jan. 30, 1877,
RGBI 83, § 293; 1 DICEY & MORRIS, supra note 32, at 227, 9-002 (indicating that the
method is used in England).
136.
See Slater v. Mexican Nat'l Ry. Co., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904) (granting a
claim brought under Mexican law on the theory that "although the act complained of
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the interpretation and the application of foreign law. For instance, it
is often said that foreign law must be applied as it is interpreted in
the system of origin. 137 According to this view, the judge should
behave exactly the same way in which a judge of the other state
would behave. 138 The goal is to reach the same result regardless of
where the transient cause of action is adjudicated.
Although it may not be as obvious, this view is also influenced by
considerations of international relations. To understand how, it is
important to consider the notion of a "state" in international law. It
is a commonplace in international law doctrine that we will not
inquire into the legitimacy of a state for purposes of recognizing the
state. 139 For a state to exist, it is sufficient (1) that a government is
ruling effectively over a certain territory and a people, and (2) that
the government has at least the capacity to engage in relations with
other states. 140 This theory has spread into conflict-of-laws because
we accept the foreign law (within the limits of public policy) as it
without
effectively governs a state's territory and its people
1 41
it.
enacted
that
regime
the
of
character
the
considering
The advantage of the theory is that it frees the choice-of-law
question from politics. It disregards that conflicts between states
have repercussions on private relationships by insulating the latter
as pure "facts." The problem with this view, however, is that it denies
the normative quality of foreign law. Foreign law, as all law, has a

was subject to no law having force in the forum, it gave rise to an obligation, an
obligatio, which, like other obligations, follows the person, and may be enforced
wherever the person may be found."); JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS 105 (1916). On the theory of vested rights, see also infra note 143 and
accompanying text.
137.
See, e.g., Hughes Electronics Corp. v. Citibank Delaware, 120 Cal. App. 4th
251, 263-65 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (paying deference to the attitude of the New York
Court of Appeals in applying New York law).
See, e.g., KEGEL & SCHURIG, supra note 1, at 506 (noting that case law of
138.
another state has to be followed to the same extent by the court as it would have been
followed by the courts of the other state).
139.
See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
140.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES § 201 (1987). This is independent of the disputed question whether a state
comes into being as a fact or through recognition by other states. For the first opinion,
see, for example, ANTONIO SANCHEZ DE BUSTAMENTE Y SIRVEN, I DERECHO
For the second view, see, for example,
INTERNACIONAL PUBLICO 154-55 (1933).
1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 96, at 125. Although the proponents of the latter theory deny
that a government comes into being as a mere fact, they assume that the other states
have a duty to recognize a state if certain conditions of fact are fulfilled. Id. at 127; see
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 202 (1987).

For instance, U.S. courts have traditionally withstood any attempt to
141.
inquire into the legitimacy of acts of other governments in conflicts situations, even if it
was a hostile regime. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398
(1964) (on Cuban expropriations); Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Fr6res S.A., 163 F.2d.
246, 248-49 (2d Cir. 1947) (on a company transfer forced by Nazi officials).
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regulatory function. It says how things should be, not how they are.
It is therefore wrong to suppose that a court following foreign law in a
specific case is merely taking a foreign fact into consideration that
already exists in the other state; rather, the court is applying that
law. If a state renders a decision based on foreign law, it follows the
same intellectual process that it would if it were applying its own law.
No decision is so easy as to avoid any question of interpretation; it
would therefore be naive to expect that a state could just look into the
other legal system to obtain a mechanical answer. The judge that
applies a foreign law always has to interpret rules and regulations as
well as render a normative decision on how the dispute should be
solved.
So, if neither comity nor the fact theory hold, why do we apply
foreign law? The best answer comes from the often criticized author
of the First Restatement, Joseph Beale. Beale stressed the need for
continuity of the law. 142 This need can hardly be fulfilled in a world
that is divided into different legal systems. While the state is
confined within the limits of its territory, private individuals are -at
least in the free world- not bound by state frontiers; they can move
around or transact over borders. Due to the mobility of civil society, a
tension arises between the divisions of the law into different legal
systems and the need for continuity of the law. When people move to
another state or enter into trans-border transactions, a legal dispute
may be brought before a court that is located outside of the state
where the all or some facts take place. Accordingly, it would
contravene the interest of justice if the court did not recognize the
legal relationship created or only considered the case under its laws.
It is thus not exclusively, and not even primarily, the foreign
state or our interest in having good relations with it that makes us
apply its law. Rather, it is the goal of doing justice, which is the
ultimate aim of every legal proceeding. The term "justice" is certainly
very blurry. It is used in this context to shift the focus from the
states and their relations to the individuals who have a stake in the
legal proceedings. Beale coined the term "vested rights" to capture
the position of the private litigants. 143 This was an unfortunate
metaphor because it portrays legal positions as facts occurring in one
state and suggests that the other state has no choice but to recognize
them. 144 However, the idea of vested rights was a reaction to the
equally extreme "comity theory" that leaves the application of foreign
law to the discretion of the state. 145 According to the latter theory, no

142.
2 BEALE, supra note 46, at 46.
143.
BEALE, supra note 13636, at 159; see also 2 BEALE, supra note 46, at 307.
144.
In Slater v. Mexican National Railway Co., Justice Holmes used an equally
ambiguous metaphor by saying that the foreign law would give "rise to an obligation"
that "follows the person." See supra note 136.
145.
See supra notes 127-13030 and accompanying text.
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state would be obligated to recognize what has happened in another
state. 146 In contrast, Beale's theory does not pose the application of
foreign law as a matter of absolute discretion. What Beale was
omitting, though, was to give a legal explanation for that result.
The real reason why a judge should apply the law of another
state is to do justice to private citizens. This rationale also clarifies
why private parties can renounce the application of a certain state's
14 7
legal system and instead opt for another: volenti non fit iniuria.
Additionally, it explains the special value of party autonomy as a
conflicts principle: given the split into different legal systems, the
best continuity of the law is achieved if all states adhere to the law
chosen by the parties in advance or after the dispute arises. Party
autonomy thus helps overcome the adverse effects for private
relationships that are caused by the division of the world into
multiple legal systems.
D. Which Law Do We Apply?
The central question of conflicts theory is how to determine the
applicable law. Several different methods have been developed to
solve this quandary. In fact, there is not enough space in this Article
to treat them all, but most of the methods used to determine the
applicable law share a common characteristic: they are statecentered. This feature explains why the varying methods are unable
to give party autonomy the role it deserves. A short overview over
conflict theories will illustrate the problem.
Using the traditional method to solve conflicts, the judge has to
apply the law of the state to which the legal relationship belongs or in
which it has its "seat".148 The functioning of this theory can be
described as jurisdiction-selecting: 1 49 for every legal relationship
there is a state which is competent. Private disputes are attributed
to the jurisdiction of that state. The task of conflict of laws is thus to
"discover" the right state. Of course this is not so easy because
conflicts cases by definition have connections to different countries.
The traditional method reacts to this issue by splitting up the legal
relationship into a number of partial questions. 150 For instance, in a

146.
See supra note 12929 and accompanying text.
147.
"A person it is not wronged by that to which he or she consents." BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
148.
See SAVIGNY, supra note 1.
149.
See DAVID F. CAVERS, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L.
REV. 173, 178 (1933) (". . . a court faithful to the conventional approach will turn in
search of a conflicts of laws rule to determine the jurisdiction whose law should govern
the question at issue.").
150.
See, e.g., SYMEONIDES, supra note 12525, at 18 ("Rather than focusing on
the conflicting laws and trying to ascertain their intended spatial reach, Savigny
focused on categories of disputes or 'legal relationships,' and then sought to identify the
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contract case, a different law may apply to problems such as form,
agency, capacity, or damages. For each set of legal questions, there is
a special conflicts rule. But under each of them, there is always one
legal system that is competent to govern the question, and only one.
Its competence must be recognized by all other states. Since the
applicable law is determined with universal validity, authors also
speak of a "multilateral" approach to conflicts. 151 The parallel to
public international law is clear: the methodology resembles the
approach taken in international conventions such as the Peace of
Westphalia or the Congress of Vienna, because the existence of
different states is recognized and competences are attributed. 152 But
what this multilateral approach cannot explain is why the parties
have an influence on the applicable law. How is it possible for them to
change the distributions of competences of legislators? How can they
even choose the law of a state that has no contacts at all to their
dispute? 153
The classic choice-of-law methodology is totally
incompatible with such private freedom, which is why traditional
theorists have, been bewildered by the growing recognition of party
154
autonomy.
In contrast to the multilateral method of classic conflict theory,
governmental interest analysis prefers a "unilateral" approach. It
starts from the assumption that each state pursues interests in its
lawmaking. 155 In a case where only the interests of one state are
concerned, there is no conflict or a "false conflict," and the law of the
interested state has to be applied. 156 In case of conflicts between the
interests of the forum and those of a foreign state, the judge has to
follow the rules of its own legislator.' 5 7 It is claimed that this theory
is more realistic than the traditional one, but again, the theory is
exclusively built around the idea of state relations. The issue of
conflicts becomes the subject of a power game between states fighting
for their interests. Of course, it is true that "states' interests" are

state in which each relationship had its 'seat,' or in whose legislative jurisdiction it
'belonged."').
151.
Id.
152.
See DANA MICHAEL HOLLYWOOD, It Takes a Village . . . or At Least a

Region: Rethinking Peace Operations in the Twenty-First Century, the Hope and
Promise of African Regional Institutions, 19 FLA. J. INT'L L. 75, 80-81 (2007)
(describing the Peace of Westphalia).
153.
See supra Part H.A.
154.
See supra Part HI.B.
155.
See CURRIE, supra note 2, at 189.
The court should then inquire whether the relationship of the forum state to
the case at bar ... is such as to bring the case within the scope of the state's
governmental concern, and to provide a legitimate basis for the assertion that
the state has an interest in the application of its policy in this instance.
156.
157.

Id. at 107, 163, 189.
Id. at 119.
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more often than not interests of individuals that are protected by the
state. 158
Even the parties' interest in enforcing contractual
agreements can be apprehended as an interest of the state in this
sense. 159 However, does a court really care for the interests of a
foreign state when it, for example, grants a contractual claim of a
foreign citizen against a citizen of its own state? Or is not the
interest of the foreign party in enforcing the agreement much more
palpable and real to the judge than the interest of the foreign state in
protecting its citizen? In its ambition to overcome the metaphysical
mechanics of the traditional theory, governmental interest analysis
has largely bypassed the importance of the individual. Instead, it has
focused on conflicts between states. Yet, more and more, states
themselves are paying deference to the individuals' choice of law.
This embarrasses interest analysis: why can the result of the power
game between states be changed by a simple agreement between
private parties? How may all-important state preferences for certain
interests be trumped by ordinary individuals? Interest analysis thus
cannot cope with party autonomy. The reason is that it suffers from
the same weakness as classic conflicts theory: it focuses too much on
international relations.
Other theories, which are less famous but equally ingenuous,
share the same defect. For instance, von Mehren and Trautman
propose to first determine the concerned jurisdictions, then to
construct the applicable rule for each, and finally in the case of a
conflict, to apply the law of the "jurisdiction predominantly
concerned.' 160
If there is irreducible conflict between several
concerned jurisdictions, they suggest a policy-weighing, which shall
include a look into the relative strength of the several policies, the
conviction with which the asserting community holds the policy, the
appropriateness of the rule to the effectuation of the policy, and the
relevant significance to the jurisdictions concerned of the vindication
of their policies. 16 1 This theory is completely focused on the state; it
leaves no room for the individual and its freedom to choose the
applicable law.

158.
See id. at 85 (describing legislators' weighing of different constituents'
interests before deciding upon a state policy).
159.
See, e.g., Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 594-95 (Cal. 1961) ("We have
no doubt that California's interest in protecting estates being probated here from false
claims based on alleged oral contracts to make wills is constitutionally sufficient to
justify the Legislature's making our statute of frauds applicable to all such contracts
sought to be enforced against such estates.").
160.
See ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN & DONALD T. TRAUTMAN,
MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 76-77 (1965).

161.

Id. at 376-92.
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Weintraub's consequence-based approach equally focuses on the
conflict between states. 162 Under this approach, it is necessary to
analyze whether the policies pursued by a state are "real" and then to
examine justifications for the policies in light of the consequences
163
that may be experienced by the state while pursuing them.
Weintraub includes the interests of the parties only as a last
reference by checking whether the application of a particular state's
law would be "fair" to the individuals involved. 164 This equity
determination should be made in relation to the number of contacts
165
the parties have with the state whose law requires application.
But Weintraub ignores that the application of a state's law may be
"fair" even if there are no contacts to that state simply because the
parties have chosen to submit to the state's law.
Similarly, of the five choice-influencing considerations developed
by Leflar, three concern the state or state relations. 16 6 He also says
that the "predictability of results" is the first point to look for, and
cites a rule that permits parties to select the law that governs their
16 7
transaction as a particular example that serves this purpose.
However, his overall opinion is that predictability is not "the major
consideration" and that other arguments have to be applied in many
cases. 168 Although Leflar's famous "better law" consideration 16 9 is
designed to achieve "justice," he assumed this could be done only on a
case by case basis. Accordingly, he closed his eyes to the possibility of
doing justice to the parties by applying general principles like party
autonomy.
In turn, the rights-based approach of Lea Brilmayer transfers
models from political theory and constitutional law to conflict of
laws. 170 This approach is especially state-centered because it views
the choice-of-law problem as residing in the relation between the
individual litigant and the judge. 171 The litigant should have a
"right" that a certain law is applied or not applied, which is directed
against the state and its organs, rather than against the other

162.
RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, An Approach to Choice of Law that Focuses on
Consequences, 56 ALB. L. REV. 701 (1993).
163.
Id. at 705-10.
164.
Id. at 711.
165.
Id.
166.

See ROBERT A. LEFLAR, Choice-InfluencingConsiderationsin Conflicts Law,

41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 282 (1966) (describing "maintenance of the interstate and
international order," "simplification of the judicial task," and "advancement of the
forum's governmental interests").
167.
Id. at 283.
168.
Id. at 285.
169.
Id. at 296.
170.
LEA BRILMAYER, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277
(1989).
171.
Id.
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party. 172 Although Brilmayer mentions consent as a justification for
the application of a certain law, she thinks it is relevant only in the
relationship between the litigant and the state. 173 However, in
agreeing to a choice-of-law clause, a litigant provides his or her
consent to the other party rather than to the state. Indeed, if the
consent is induced by fraud, the agreement is invalidated
independently of whether the state is involved in the fraud or did
know of it. Furthermore, Brilmayer neglects that private choice of
law is relevant in contexts other than dispute resolution in state
courts, like arbitration or simple contract fulfillment. The chosen law
applies because the parties have agreed to it, regardless of whether a
judge intervenes or not. Hence, party autonomy has importance first
and foremost in the horizontal relationship between the parties, not
in the relationship between the state and the individual. The judge
that applies the law chosen by the parties does not "coerce" one party,
but simply gives force to the parties' agreement.
Larry Cramer's canons of construction for true conflicts include a
specific rule that the law chosen by the parties should be applied in
contract cases. 174 Nevertheless, he has serious doubts about this
canon and only advances it "tentatively".1 75 He submits party
autonomy to the condition that there must be a "potential for true
conflict", but even under such circumstances, parties may only choose
a normally applicable law. 176 This Article has already demonstrated
177
that modern legislation has largely bypassed this restriction.
Kramer justifies the limitation by arguing that a state has no reason
to forgo the application of its law other than to accommodate the
applicable law of another state. 178 Significantly, the idea that a state
could also want to accommodate the parties does not play a role in his
theory.
From the foregoing, it has become clear that both classical and
current conflict theories are not able to account for party autonomy.
Individual choice of law simply does not fit into their systems because
they are built around the state and its relations. Indeed, if one starts
from the assumption that laws govern legal relationships
authoritatively, it is no small contradiction that the parties should be
able to influence the applicable law. How can individuals have a say
in the international distribution of legislative competencies? How can
their intentions be more important than the states' interests in a

172.
Id. at 1296 ("One's choice of law rights are, like personal jurisdiction rights,
held against the state directly. They are not rights against the other party to the
lawsuit (although, of course, they will affect one's legal claims).").
173.
Id. at 1298.
174.
KRAMER, supra note 4, at 329.
175.
Id.
176.
Id.
177.
See supra Part I.A.
178.
KRAMER, supranote 4, at 329.
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large field of the law? This puzzle has never been resolved because all
conflict theories are based on the same mistaken foundation: they
focus on international relations and treat the individual as a mere
pawn in a battle between states.

IV. A THEORETICAL

JUSTIFICATION FOR PARTY AUTONOMY

A. Individualsas the Center of the Conflicts Problem
The justification of party autonomy has to start by recalibrating
the problem of conflicts. The issue is not, as most theories suggest, a
struggle between states for the application of their respective laws. It
is important to move beyond that idea and instead think about when
and why conflict problems start in the first place: conflicts of laws
begin with a dispute between individuals.
In order to elaborate this idea, we need to reconsider the classic
view of choice of law. It can be summarized as follows: every single
event in the world is governed by a certain legal system. This legal
system can be determined objectively. The problem, of course, is that
there may be different legal systems demanding their application.
From the classic viewpoint, the result is a competition between
states. The applicable law must be decided from an inter-national
perspective, by delimiting the respective sphere of the competencies
of the different legislators. Since laws govern situations objectively,
there is no way that the will of the parties could influence the
outcome. Individuals are submitted to the law, and they do not have
a say in when and where it applies. Giving private persons the power
to select the applicable law would mean that they could choose the
rules to which they are submitted. That seems counterintuitive. For
any lawyer that takes the primacy of the law over the individual's
will seriously, it is plain to see that the applicable law cannot be
determined by a private decision.
In contrast to this classic view, this Article suggests a counterconcept that is able to account for party autonomy. It relies on the
following propositions: the origin of the conflicts problem is not a
battle between states, but lies instead in the private sphere.
Typically, the question of the applicable law arises with regard to
private situations such as contractual negotiations or litigations. If
state actors are in any way involved, very different questions are
raised that are solved in a distinct fashion. 179 That means that
conflict of laws in the traditional sense, and the sense that this

179.

See the examples taken from criminal and public law supra Part III.B.
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Article addresses, exist primarily between private individuals. i8 0 It
is the individuals who will feel the consequences of the application of
a particular law, and it is their interests that are most directly
concerned by the outcome of the dispute. If we consider the issue of
conflicts in this way, it is only natural that the parties can choose the
applicable law. They must be able to fashion their relationship the
way they like. Only a very legalistic and state-centered perspective
can assert that conflicts of laws should not be influenced by
individuals. Such an approach assumes that the scope of application
of national laws is fixed and that there is no room for private
decision-making. However, the problem of today's world is that there
are a number of laws that demand their application. From a legal
perspective, too many contradictory rules with equal right to be
followed create a void. Thus, we are back in a state of nature, or
more precisely, in a "modern state of nature," where there is no
objectively applicable law - paradoxically because of an abundance of
law. In this context, the parties regain their residual power to
regulate their relationships.'l 8 Party autonomy means nothing more
than that people can take care of their own affairs.
That does not amount to saying that the parties would enthrone
their will as a source of law, as the above mentioned provision of the
French Civil Code suggests.18 2 The concept advanced here has
nothing to do with creating a private law, and it does not collide with
the state's monopoly to legislate. Party autonomy refers to the power
of the individual to choose between different national laws, but that
choice has to be made among existing laws. Additionally, the theory
does not consider the possibility of choosing an a-national law, a kind
8 3 The rules that can be
of "new law merchant" or lex mercatoria.1
chosen under party autonomy are, in the first place,' 8 4 only laws that
are made by states. Through party autonomy, private individuals do
not regain the power of self-legislation, only the power to adopt the
appropriate existing legislation.
The main argument made here is that the outcome of conflict-oflaws issues mainly concern individuals, not states. The states
themselves have understood this point better than theory. That is
why they have allowed individuals to choose the applicable law in
many cases. This has not caused them any theoretical headaches.
On the contrary, it is totally in line with the purpose of the conflicts

180.
For the sake of clarity and brevity, the Author is leaving aside the case in
which a state behaves like a private individual. What can be said, though, is that if a
state enters into a choice-of-law clause with a private person, the agreement would
have to be treated along the same lines as one between private individuals.
181.
See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 3-9 (1974) (discussing
regulation in the absence of a state).
182.
See supra note 53.
183.
See supra note 78.
184.
For an extension, see infra Part V.A.
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mechanism from the practical perspective. As we have seen, the
application of another state's law is a pragmatic solution that serves
primarily the interests of the individuals involved.18 5 Only the
application of another state's mandatory rules of law can be
considered as a favor to another state and therefore is subject to a
policy weighing.' 8 6 The goal of the normal conflict rules on issues
such as the applicable tort or contract law, however, is not to favor
another state, but rather to favor the parties or one party involved in
the dispute. Since the whole application of a foreign law is designed
to serve the interests of individuals, there is no reason why they
should not be able to decide themselves on the applicable legal
regime. Nonetheless, from a doctrinal perspective, this requires a
major paradigm shift. Party autonomy can only be justified if one
ignores the state relations that have so far been the focus of the
classic theory. One needs to accept that the parties are the center of
the conflicts problem. They are allowed to choose the applicable law
because it is their dispute that is in question. The state renounces
predicting the outcome of the choice-of-law process so as to allow the
parties to design their individual relationships according to their
wishes and needs.
In a way, party autonomy resembles the role of the will in
national contract law. 18 7 Almost all states give important weight to
the intentions of the parties. Most of these rules are designed to help
the parties in shaping, changing, and fulfilling their private
agreement. Only some rules serve the protection of special groups,
like consumers, and are therefore mandatory. The goal of the other
rules is to enable private parties to structure their relationships
autonomously.
But there is an important difference between freedom of contract
and party autonomy: under the latter principle, parties are allowed to
deselect even mandatory legal provisions.' 8 8 The crucial question is
why the state allows private individuals to disregard the otherwise

185.
See supraPart III.C.
186.
See supra note 13333 and accompanying text. However, it has to be noted
that the provision of Swiss law cited there does not allow the application of foreign
mandatory rules on the grounds that the state that enacted them has a particular
interest in the case. Instead, the Swiss provision refers exclusively to the interest of
one of the parties involved. Thus, even the application of mandatory rules of another
state can be justified by the interests of the individual.
187.
For the view that contract law is based on the autonomy of the individual,
see CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACTS AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION
21 (1981). For the contrasting view that economic analysis justifies contract law by
considerations of efficiency, see, for example, RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF LAW 94-95 (6th ed. 2003). While this view has some merit for exchange contracts, it
cannot explain the binding force of contracts in other areas such as family law. For an
overview of the philosophical foundations of contract law, see JOSEPH M. PERILLO &
JOHN D. CALAMARI, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 6-12 (5th ed. 2003).
188.
See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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justice are not the only ones, but that
made by other states. It would of course be possible for the state to
enforce its own laws in every case brought before its courts. But it is
a wise kind of self-constraint not to do so and to instead give the
18 9
parties the liberty to choose which justice fits their relation best.
By adopting a rule of party autonomy the state makes the choice-oflaw process independent of international relations and lays it in the
hands of private parties. No longer will state interests or state
preferences for certain policies determine the applicable law.
Instead, it is the parties themselves that decide which law is to be
followed. One could therefore describe party autonomy as a private
solution to a state-made problem.
In spite of the tremendous extension of party autonomy in the
last decades, 190 there remain many areas in which states exclude the
parties' freedom to choose the applicable law. Interestingly, the field
of contract law in which party autonomy is most universally
restricted is consumer law. 191 In consumer law, the conditions of
autonomy, especially equal bargaining power, are not fulfilled. It is
therefore understandable that the choice of the parties is not given
much weight.
But there are other fields in which parties are not allowed to
choose the applicable law themselves: cases in which the states take a
predominant interest. A classic example is antitrust law. In this
field, the interests of the community at large supersede the interests
of the parties to a transaction. Self-regulation is not the primary
concern because there is more at stake. Therefore, the state does not
allow the parties to choose the applicable law. 192 In the area in which
party autonomy is excluded, the legislator gives clear commands to
the judge which law to apply. The judge's role resembles here less to
that of an arbitrator committed to the idea of justice, and more to
that of an administrative agency. Consequently, there is a clear
dominance of the lex fori in this area, while laws of other states to the
193
same effect are viewed with suspicion.

189.
190.
191.

See supra note 73.
See supra Part I.A.
See U.C.C. § 1-301(e) (2004); ROME CONVENTION, supra note 38, art. 5;

ROME I REGULATION DRAFT, supra note 38, art. 6; see also UNIF. COMPUTER
INFORMATION TRANSACTIONS ACT § 109(b)(2) (1999); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. b (1971).

See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 637
192.
n.19 (1985) (noting that the Court would not accept the circumvention of U.S. antitrust
law by a combined choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clause).
See the famous axiom that 'The Courts of no country execute the penal
193.
laws of another." Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 666 (1892); The Antelope, 23
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In sum, we can see that there are two different fields of conflicts:
one that is largely dominated by state interests and another in which
private parties are allowed to choose the applicable law. These two
fields form the main strands of the conflicts problem. Theorists have
so far mainly focused on the first area, and extended the lessons from
there well into the second. It is of course true that the state might
also have relevant interests in the resolution of cases which fall into
the field of potential party choice of law. 19 4 Realistically, almost no
law is enacted without some special purpose for the community in
mind. But it is very important to see that the state, by adopting a
rule of party autonomy, makes these considerations subject to the
choice of the parties. If the parties do not like a law, they are allowed
to exclude it by a simple sentence. From this, it can be reasonably
concluded that the state itself considers the public interests served by
the law to be secondary to the goal of accommodating the parties
bound in a conflict of laws. Underlying this attitude is the realization
that in such disputes, the most important variable is the individual
and his or her needs and expectations. Any parochial considerations
based on state interests have to stand behind.
B. Philosophical Underpinnings
It might be interesting to give some philosophical basis to the
results found. The growing recognition of party autonomy implies
that the individual occupies a more prominent place in the conflicts
system than it was thought before. The individual is recognized as an
actor in choice of law, and his or her wants and needs are taken into
consideration.
One could parallel this development with the growing acceptance
of the individual as a subject of international law. 19 5 But conflict of
laws differs from international law. While the latter acknowledges
the existence of a person with individual rights, the former focuses on
the person's freedom to choose the applicable legal regime.
This freedom is a necessary expression of individual autonomy.
In fact, the word "autonomy" in Greek translates to the phrase "to
give oneself a law."'1 96 By adopting the principle of party autonomy,
the legislator -consciously or unconsciouslyrecognizes the

U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123 (1825). See also Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600, 604 (2d Cir.
1929) (indicating hesitations in applying foreign tax law).
194.
See supra note 13434 and accompanying text.
195.
See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 65 (6TH ED.
2003); PIERRE-MARIE DuPuY, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 147-49 (2d ed. 1993);
KNUT IPSEN, VOLKERRECHT 95-96 (5TH ED. 2004); HERSCH LAUTERPACHT,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 27-47 (1973).
196.
MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 148 (3d ed.
1993).
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fundamental principle of private autonomy in choice of law. 197 No
longer is choice of law an abstract, "value-free" discipline, as it was
often described in the literature. 198 Instead, it is acknowledged that
one of the goals of the conflicts-of-law process is to serve the
individual.19 9 The person, as an autonomous being with its own
preferences, is put at the center of choice of law. This is in line with
the goal of all law from an individualistic perspective, according to
which the purpose of legal rules should be oriented towards the
individual, not the state. For philosophical support, one could cite
authors like Kant, 200 Hayek, 20 1 or Nozick. 20 2 Party autonomy can
also be justified from a Rawlsian perspective, because choice-of-law
clauses adopted at the time of the conclusion of a contract resemble
20 3
the agreement on the applicable rules under the veil of ignorance.
The idea of the individual as an autonomous being with freedom
to choose is well-known in national laws. In conflict of laws, it has
taken time to embrace the same concept because positivism taught
that autonomy could be exercised only within the state. Slowly, but
steadily, the idea is gaining momentum that a person can also have
autonomy on the international-or better-transnational level.
But there are counterarguments to that. It is important to bear
in mind that many countries do not adhere to the "Western" ideals of
individual autonomy and private freedom. They still restrict the
liberty of their citizens in important ways. Indeed, these states' laws
will also often restrict party autonomy significantly. 20 4 Even in
western states, we have numerous exceptions to the liberty of the
20 5
individual to choose the applicable law.

197.
See, e.g., FRIED, supra note 187 (discussing freedom as the basis of contract
law).
198.
See JUENGER, supra note 11717, at 185.
199.
This position was far from being accepted in the old literature on choice of
law. For an early criticism of individualism in conflicts of laws, see HENRI BATIFFOL,
ASPECTS PHILOSOPHIQUES DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVt 70-77 (1956) (arguing that
because an individualist conception of law is inherently subjective, such a conception
subverts the purpose of law, particularly in the context of conflict of laws).
200.
IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary Gregor trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1797).
201.
1 FRIEDRICH AUGUST HAYEK, LAw, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY (1973).
202.
NoZICK, supra note 181.
203.
Cf. JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-41 (new ed. 2005).
204.
Many states put restrictions on foreign investment. See Jessica Zoe
Renwald, Foreign Investment Law in the People's Republic of China, What to Expect
From Enterprise Establishment to Dispute Resolution, 16 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
453, 461-466 (discussing restrictions and establishment procedures for foreign
investment in China); Van v. Mejia, The Modern Foreign Investment Laws of the
Philippines, 17 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 467, 484 (2003) (discussing a negative list for
foreign investment in the Philippines); Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Foreign Investment in
Cuba: Prospects and Perils, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 903, 908-09 (2003)
(mentioning restrictions and impediments to foreign direct investment in Cuba).
205.
See supra Part I.
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The lesson is simple: although party autonomy enjoys growing
acceptance, it is far from being unlimited. Every state is free to
restrict party autonomy by heaving mandatory provisions to the level
of public policy. There is no natural law principle that would stop a
legislator from doing so. Private liberty only goes so far as the state
This does not make party autonomy an unimportant
allows.
principle. It is just that its application is, as any other principle,
subject to the state's continuing power to restrict it. Yet, it remains
that party autonomy is the most universally recognized conflict-oflaws principle. 20 6 It is this acceptance in national law that gives the
principle its particular thrust.
C. A New Normative Theory: Relatively Mandatory Rules
The recognition of party autonomy has important implications
for normative theory. The fact that states allow parties to exclude
whole legal systems, including even their mandatory rules, creates a
problem for the traditional categorization of legal sources. The classic
dichotomy between mandatory rules and default rules simply does
not hold anymore. It has already been superseded in other areas of
the law such as public international law, where a third kind of law
has been discussed under the heading "soft law. ' 20 7 In conflicts, due
to the recognition of party autonomy, we can find other kinds of legal
rules. While these rules cannot be deviated from in a national
context, they are subject to the parties' choice from an international
perspective.
Significantly, they are different from rules of
international public policy, which are always binding and whose
208
application cannot be circumvented by a choice-of-law provision.
The distinction between these two types of rules is explicitly
recognized in European law. 20 9 The distinction has also found its way
into U.S. legislation. 210 Rules that cannot be deviated from in a

206.
207.

See supra Part II.A.
See, e.g., ULRICH FASTENRATH, Relative Normativity in InternationalLaw,
4 EUR. J. INT'L LAW 305 (1993); JOSEPH GOLD, Strengthening the Soft International
Law of Exchange Arrangements, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 443 (1983); see also COMMITMENT
AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL

SYSTEM (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000).
208.

See supra notes 191191-193.

209.
Cf. ROME CONVENTION, supra note 38, arts. 3(3), 7 (distinguishing between
"mandatory rules of law" and "rules of the law ... applicable irrespective of the law
otherwise applicable to the contract"). On the historical roots of the distinction, see
MAYER & HEUZt, supra note 1, at 516. See also ROME I REGULATION DRAFT, supra note

38, art. 9 (using the term "overriding mandatory provisions", and requiring that the
respect for them must be "regarded as crucial by a country for safeguarding its public
interests, such as its political, social or economic organisation").
210.
See U.C.C. § 1-301(f) (2004) (introducing the notion of a "fundamental"
policy of a state as the only limit to party autonomy); id. § 1-301(f) cmt. 6
(distinguishing between legal rules that are mandatory in national law and laws that
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national case but that may be opted out of at the international level
may be referred to as "relatively mandatory." They are "relatively"
mandatory because they are absolutely binding from the internal
point of view, but can be deviated from at the outer level. To better
understand relatively mandatory rules, it may be useful to consider
them by analogy to the human system of language.
One can describe language as a system of symbols through which
persons can communicate. 211 Each language contains a number of
phonological, morphological, semantic, and syntactic rules.212 These
rules determine how the sounds can be put together, how words can
be made from morphemes, how meaning can be expressed through
words, and how words can be combined to create sentences. 213 Rules
on language are certainly mandatory from an inner point of view. For
instance, participants to a communication in French cannot use
semantic or syntactic rules totally unknown in French and pretend
they are still speaking French (not even "bad French"). On the other
hand, language is not obligatory from an outer point of view:
obviously, the parties can switch to another language if they want to.
The latter kind of freedom is similar to party autonomy.
The parallel between law and language is underscored by
another point. Consider how languages are employed. Generally,
they apply within a particular territory. Within their territorial
delimitation, languages resemble the law according to the traditional
214
theory that is based on the notion of territorial sovereignty.
However, territory and the use of a language do not completely
overlap. Nor is there complete overlap between territory and the
applicability of a certain law, if one is taking account of the parties'
ability to choose the legal system.
There are a number of other fascinating similarities between law
and language, such as the possibility to choose a "neutral" law or
language and the striking preference for Anglo-American law and the
English language in international commerce. 2 15 What is important
here is that law and language resemble each other in the way in
which they function as a system. They are mandatory in the sense
that you cannot deviate from their rules once you are in the system.

cannot be deviated from through a choice of law); see also SCOLES ET AL., supra note 12,
at 961-63.
211.
JOHN LYONS, INTRODUCTION TO THEORETICAL LINGUISTICS 50 (1969);
BRUCE L. PEARSON, INTRODUCTION TO LINGUISTIC CONCEPTS 4 (1997); EDGAR
STURTEVANT, A DEFINITION OF LANGUAGE, IN: PERSPECTIVES ON LANGUAGE 5 (John A.

Rycenga & Joseph Schwartz eds., 1963). See generally FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE,
COURS DE LINGUISTIQUE GtNtRALE 23-27 (Charles Bally & Albert Sechehaye eds.,
Payot 1955) (1916) (defining 'language" generally).
212.
PEARSON, supra note 21111.
213.

Id. at 9-12; LYONS, supra note 21111, at 50.

214.
215.

See supra Part III.D (discussing the traditional conflicts theory).
Id.
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However, whether you use one or the other system is up to a private,
individually made choice, which is not restricted by any connections
to your location. Law and language can therefore both be referred to
as relatively mandatory systems.
As a basic characteristic of relatively mandatory rules, it has
already been suggested that they are optional from an outer
perspective. From this characteristic, another crucial feature can be
derived: the choice of relatively mandatory rules has no connection
whatsoever to the power of the rules' drafter. The classic viewpoint,
which treats conflict of laws as a battle between states, logically leads
to the consequence that the state's power extends to contracts which
have been submitted to its law. 216 However, in reality, the rule
maker does not get any closer to a disputed set of facts by virtue of a
private choice of its rules. For instance, Italy-or the Italian people,
if considered in the figurative sense to be the "author" of the Italian
language-does not get any authority over a communication simply
by the fact that the participants talk Italian. Similarly, the parties'
choice of Italian law does not give the Italian state an authority over
those parties that the state did not have before. The authority of the
rulemaker is thus not affected by a private choice of its rules. Party
autonomy does not mean to assign a case to the authority of the state
that has enacted the rules, but rather to use the rules without
extending the state's authority. Where private choice works, the
international distribution of competencies between the states is left
untouched. 217 This is just a more complicated way of saying that
party autonomy is not the deciding factor in a battle between states
Yet, the point made has
over their respective competencies.
important consequences for the practical application of party
2 18
autonomy, which will be demonstrated later.
D. The Conditionfor Party Autonomy
Party autonomy, like every rule, has its restrictions. As said
from the outset, this Article does not focus on the limits that are
drawn to the principle by public policy. 219 Those limits exist, and
most of them are defined by each state in its own, peculiar way.
There is, however, a fundamental condition that is necessary in order
for party autonomy to apply, which is the same all over the world: the
case must have the potential of being subject to the laws of more than

See, e.g., CALEB, supra note 1022, at 56 (arguing that to say a national law
216.
is applicable to a legal relationship would equal a determination of the sphere of the
sovereign that has enacted the law).
217.
See infra Part V.
218.
Id.
See supra Part I.
219.
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one state. 220 If there is no choice-of-laws dimension, parties are not
allowed to discard the mandatory law of their jurisdiction. 22 1 They
are, of course, free to incorporate the law of another state into their
agreement. 222 However, such a choice does not implicate a conflicts
rule; instead, it is a pure case of freedom of contract under national
law.223

Thus, before applying the rule of party autonomy, one must first
ask whether two legal systems are potentially applicable to the
problem.
Now one may ask whether this inquiry implicitly
legitimizes the state-centered view of conflicts (i.e., that every
conflicts problem arises from a battle between states over the
application of their respective legal rules).22 4 The answer is that
party autonomy is, indeed, based on the divergence between different
legal orders. But party autonomy allows the parties to dissolve the
links of the case to particular states and determine the applicable
legal rules freely. It uses a private perspective to get rid of the
eternal quarrels between states.
An additional concern may be: when is a case sufficiently
international to justify party autonomy?
This is an important
question. As a starting point, it may be helpful to think of a purely
domestic case. One might identify a case as purely domestic because
it does not have contacts to any other state. But are there really any
such cases? For example, it is not improbable that a contract for the
sale of a high-rise in Manhattan between two New Yorkers will be
drafted on a computer that was manufactured in China or
Malaysia. 22 5 For this reason alone, we would not call the sale an
"international transaction."
There is a contact to another
jurisdiction-we just do not consider it an important one. What this
hypothetical exemplifies is that almost all cases in the world have
links to more than one state. 226 Yet it would not cross our mind to
apply the law of another state in many of them. Whether we regard a
case as purely domestic or international depends on whether we

220.
See infra note 227 and accompanying text.
221.
A counterexample seems to be the UCITA, which allows parties to choose
foreign law also in "domestic" transactions.
UNIF. COMPUTER INFORMATION
TRANSACTIONS ACT § 109 (1999); see WOODWARD, supra note 36, at 738. However, the
computer information transactions covered by UCITA are characterized by the fact
that they have no situs. UNIF. COMPUTER INFORMATION TRANSACTIONS ACT § 109.
Therefore, there is always a potential insecurity about the applicable law, and no
transaction can be called "domestic" in the proper sense of the word.
222.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(1) (1971). For a

discussion of the provision, see supranote 57 and accompanying text.
223.
See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
224.
See supra Part III.
225.
For similar examples used in the literature, see FERNANDEZ ROZAS &
SANCHEZ LORENZO, supra note 1, at 49-50.
226.
Id.
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227
It
would seriously think about applying the law of state A or B.
follows that the question of when a choice-of-law question is raised
cannot be answered with absolute certainty. It depends on how one
values the importance of the contacts to other jurisdictions. This in
turn is largely a function of the rules of our domestic law and the
weight it attaches to certain facts.
It can thus be said that the reach of party autonomy is insecure
because it depends on a condition that is neither objectively nor
uniformly determined.
However, party autonomy shares this
insecurity with the whole discipline of conflicts. There is simply no
'228
precise criterion to determine when there is a "conflict of laws.
We can live with this problem, because we intuitively know in most
cases whether there is a conflict or not. In the borderline cases, each
legal system must decide whether the insecurity about the applicable
law is significant enough to raise the issue of which law should be
applied. Only if the answer is "yes" will the legal system possibly
allow the parties to decide the issue themselves. This means that the
reach of party autonomy is ultimately in the states' hands. It also
means that the applicability of party autonomy depends on the fact
that there is a collision of laws at all. But the important point is that
party autonomy allows a solution outside the conflict between states
by taking it to the level of the private relationship between the
parties, where the consequences will most clearly be felt.
In principle, there is no limit to the individual's power to choose
the applicable law as long as the relevant questions merely concern
the individual and do not implicate any third parties. The earlier
discussion of the growing extension of party autonomy in national
laws supports this assertion.229 There is therefore no reason, at least
not on the theoretical level, to exclude areas such as tort law or
unjust enrichment from the ambit of party autonomy. There is also
no reason to exclude the formation of the contract itself from the
possibility of private choice of law. 230 At first glance, it may seem
circular to allow the parties to agree on the rules under which their
agreement is to come into existence. In reality, however, there is no
such contradiction. Since there is usually no single law that could
demand its application on the validity of the agreement, it makes
sense to allow the choice of rules under which such validity is to be
determined. There are too many nuts, bolds, and screws that the
parties could not have foreseen and that should be resolved under a
law that they have chosen. Choice of law may even concern the

227.

See supra Part II.B.

228.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971) (referring to

events and transactions "that may have a significant relationship to more than one
state", but leaving open when this is the case).
229.
See supra Part II.A.
230.
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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question whether there was an agreement at all, as long as the choice
of law is supported by a minimum of mutual consent. 231 The same
could be said with regard to other rules of contract formation such as
the parole evidence rule. 23 2 They all are part of a certain national
law. Because there is no national law that would be objectively
applicable, one can select and deselect these rules.
Since the question of contract formation can be governed by the
chosen law, one could even submit the capacity of the parties to
contract to the chosen law. This is the solution of the Second
Restatement. 23 3 It is true that this seems like pulling bootstraps,
since the capacity is itself a condition for a valid contract. But even
in Europe, where issues of capacity are generally determined by
referring to the law of nationality or habitual residence, there are
attenuations. The Rome Convention restricts the claim of incapacity
if both parties have been in one country and one party could not be
aware of the incapacitation of the other at the time of the conclusion
of the contract. 234 There is no reason why a different result should
ensue if the parties are in different countries but choose a legal
system under which both have capacity. It makes no sense to require
one party to move physically to another country in order to be able to
enter into a valid contract.
Finally, there are some rules in every legal system that we
consider as so basic that it seems unthinkable they could be
deselected by a private decision. Among these rules is, for instance,
the prohibition of fraud. 235 However, because this rule is based on
public policy, it is not treated here. 23 6 Nonetheless, can the selection
of a law itself amount to fraud? Certainly one could imagine such
situations. Think for instance of a British company using a standard
form contract with respect to a U.S. consumer that contains a fine
print clause purporting to render the law of Burkina Faso applicable.
The question arises under which law the validity of such a clause
must be tested. Preliminarily, one could look at the chosen law itself,
i.e., the law of Burkina Faso. It is more than likely that it will
contain a prohibition of fraud. If this were not the case, or if the
prohibition could not be construed in a way that corresponds to the
minimum standard of fair contract rules, then one could refer as a
last resort to general principles of law. The maxim fraus omnia

231.
In European conflict of laws, this minimum of consent is ensured by
allowing one party to invoke the law of its habitual residence. ROME CONVENTION,
supra note 38, arts. 3(4), 8(2). See also ROME I REGULATION DRAFT, supranote 38, arts.
3(5), 10(2).
232.
See generally PERILLO & CALAMARI, supra note 187, at §§ 3.1 to 3.8.
233.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 198(1), 187.

234.
Cf. ROME CONVENTION, supra note 38, art. 11.
See also ROME I
REGULATION DRAFr, supranote 38, art. 13.
235.
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 4.11-4.15 (2004).
236.
See supraPart I.
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corrumpit applies, of course, also with regard to choice-of-law
agreements. 23 7 This is nothing special, but just the consequence of
the normal rules for contracts. We should not forget that the choiceof-law clause itself is a contract and therefore subject to the general
principles of contract formation.

V. PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF THE NEW PARADIGM
A. Effects on the Validity and the Reach of Choice-of-Law Clauses
Where does the new paradigm lead with regard to the practical
questions mentioned above? 238 It would be wrong to suppose that the
theory developed here would solve them all at once. The ideas of
individual autonomy and relatively mandatory rules of law are not
talismans that can simply provide answers to all the relevant
questions. Yet, they make it easier to understand why some solutions
that have been intuitively reached by courts and writers can also be
justified theoretically.
First, there is the question of whether the mandatory rules of the
chosen law apply. 23 9 From the perspective of the individual, it is
wrong to assume that by choosing a certain legal system, all of the
mandatory rules of the chosen law automatically apply as well. It
would be akin to suggesting that by choosing to speak Chinese, a
person submits himself to all commands of the Chinese Government.
240
Party autonomy does not change the authority of the rule makers.
Therefore, a choice of law does not have the consequence of
completely submitting one to the chosen legal system.
The
implication of the theory of relatively mandatory rules 241 is that the
parties may use foreign law as a source for construing and
interpreting their agreement, without submitting themselves to the
legal regime of the state that is the author of the rules.
The second question was whether the parties should be free to
refer to some system of law that is not state-made. 242 If one focuses
on conflicts between states, then of course it makes sense to restrict
the parties' choice to one of the laws that are at variance. 243 But by
dropping the idea that party autonomy is meant to resolve a conflict
between states, it becomes understandable why the parties should

237.
See FARNSWORTH, supra note 235 (discussing the effects of fraud on the
validity of the contract in general).
238.
See supraPart II.C.
239.
See supraPart II.C.
240.
See supraPart IV.C.
241.
See supraPart IV.C.
242.
See supraPart II.C.
243.
See KRAMER, supra note 4.
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also be able to choose rules that have not been enacted by a state. To
employ the parallel to language: the parties could also create their
own private language and choose to use it as a code in which they
communicate. Indeed, the possibility of choosing a-national rules of
law to govern a dispute or contract has been recognized by
international legal texts. 244 It does not mean that parties would be
allowed to completely free themselves from state-law since public
policy rules would of course remain applicable. But there is simply no
reason why one should allow the parties to use the contract rules of
Burma and not the rules of a business organization like the
International Chamber of Commerce. The parties should also be able
245
to choose a religious law if it contains provisions on contract law.
Of course, a problem occurs if the system chosen by the parties does
not provide exhaustive rules to cover all questions of the dispute. In
this case, the court has to supplement the chosen rules with those of
another system. But this system should be chosen carefully by taking
the choice of the parties into account.
The third problem concerns the effect of the choice of a law that
invalidates the agreement. It is clear that the parties' intention will
most likely be to have a valid contract and to disregard the choice of
law insofar as it leads to a contrary result. The one thing that you
want at the moment of entering into a contract (in good faith) is that
your agreement is binding.2 4 6 This result is so important that some
authors have summarized it under a special name: the "Basic Rule of
Validation." 247 Weintraub suggests that this Rule is even more
important than party autonomy. 248 However, this would be to "put

244.
For instance, Article the UNCITRAL Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration speaks of "rules of law" that the parties can choose.
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, art. 28(1)1,

June 21, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 1302. The term is carefully distinguished from "law" and is
meant to give the parties a wider range of options. They can, for instance, select rules
that are not part of the legal system of a state. See id., Explanatory Note by the
UNCITRAL Secretariat, No. 35.
245.
The English Court of Appeal expressed a different opinion in Shamil Bank
of Bahrain EC v. Beximco Pharmaceuticals Ltd and others, [2004] 1 W.L.R. 1784
(Eng.), which held a choice of Sharia law and English law combined to be meaningless
and void. Id. Yet, if Sharia law indeed did not provide any rule concerning the validity
of a contract-which is open to doubt-, one could easily have justified the exclusive
application of English law. If, on the contrary, Sharia law invalidated the agreement,
the considerations regarding the choice of an invalidating law following in the text
would apply.
246.
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAwS § 187 cmt. e (1971)
("The parties can be assumed to have intended that the provisions of the contract
would be binding upon them.").
247.
See ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, The Statute of Frauds in the Conflict of Laws:
The Basic Rule of Validation, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 874 (1959) (discussing the "basic rule
of validation"); ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, Contracts in the Conflict of Laws-Part One:
Validity, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 975 (1959) (same); WEINTRAUB, supra note 4, at 44952 (discussing validation).
248.
See WEINTRAUB supra note 4.
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the barge before the tug." Two issues have to be distinguished: the
liberty of the parties to choose the applicable law, and their
willingness to enter into a binding contract. One should not be
played against the other. Party autonomy stands as the main
principle because it is important not only for the validity of a
contract, but also for its construction and interpretation. Yet, the
choice of the parties also has to be interpreted. Their goal of
validating the contract can most easily be achieved if one overcomes
the idea that conflict of laws means to attribute competencies to
states. If one disassociates the rules from the rule maker, it becomes
easy to see that the parties, through a choice of law, do not need to
completely submit themselves to a legal system, including that
system's invalidating provisions. As in choice of language, the private
conception of choice of law leaves room for some deviation if both
parties at least implicitly agree to it. If they used, for instance, some
term of a foreign language in a wrong sense, but both preferred the
same interpretation, then the judge would have to follow their will.
The Romans described this with the expression falsa demonstratio
non nocet-the false designation does not hurt. 249 The same principle
applies to a choice of an invalidating law with the goal to enter a
binding agreement. The theory of relatively mandatory rules of law
explains why it is possible to submit the contract to a legal system
without simultaneously applying its rules that invalidate the
contract.
The fourth question was whether the parties can apply different
legal rules across various sections of the contract. Under most
conflicts theories, such a possibility is not easy to explain because it
would mean that more than one state would be competent to rule on
the same or related question. But if one focuses on the individual and
not on the state, there is no reason to think that the parties should
not be able to split the legal regime. Since choosing the law does not
mean to assign the case to the competence of a rule maker, it is
possible to combine the laws of different states. The language
parallel 250 suggests the same result: in conversations or in poems,
sometimes expressions from different languages are employed; in a
similar vein, parties can use rules of different legal systems to apply
25 1
to their contract. This solution has been recognized by legislation.
However, a limit to ddpe~age is intelligibility: if the notions and rules
of the chosen laws cannot work together, the judge has to think about
deviating from the parties' choice.

249.
See JOSEPH WARREN, Interpretation of Wills: Recent Developments, 49
HARV. L. REV. 689, 699 (1936).
250.
See supra Part lV.C.
251.
ROME CONVENTION, supranote 38, art. 3(1)3. See also ROME I REGULATION
DRAFT, supra note 38, art. 3(1)3.
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The fifth question was whether the parties can agree on an
alternative or floating choice-of-law clause. 252 The focus on the
individual suggests that they can. Yet, the parallel to language
creates some doubts: obviously you cannot draft a document and
leave open the language in which it is written. However, you could
write a text in a language that has two very similar versions, like
Serbo-Croatian, and subsequently determine in which version you
want it to be interpreted. This comparison does not provide any
response as to the validity of an alternative or floating choice-of-law
clause, but it shows at least why this question is so problematic: if the
language is to be determined later, how is the document to be
interpreted in the meantime? What if the ex post choice has the
effect that the text does not make sense anymore because its terms
cannot be understood under the chosen language? For much the
same reasons, one could imagine that a court finds itself unable to
understand the agreement under a floating or alternative choice-oflaw clause. The limit to validity of this clause is thus again
intelligibility, not the dogma that the competent state law must be
determined from the creation of the agreement.
Lastly, the question was asked whether the parties can "petrify"
or "freeze" the applicable law. 253 From the viewpoint of individual
autonomy and in line with what has been said earlier with regard to
the validity of the contract, 254 there is no doubt that they can. This is
because by choosing a certain system of law, the parties can use its
rules on validation and interpretation, without submitting
themselves to the authority of the rule maker. Abstracting the rule of
law from its drafter, as has been suggested here, 255 makes it possible
to render the law immune from any later changes. The language
parallel works to the same effect: as you can choose to speak in
French of the 17th century, you can freeze the applicable law to a
former time. Yet, everything depends on the intention of the parties.
Like language, law is a living animal. Parties should not normally be
presumed to have the intention to cut themselves from any future
changes (or improvements) of the law that they have chosen. For the
petrifaction or freeze of the applicable law, a specific clause to that
effect is necessary. Without it, the chosen law applies as it is at the
256
time of the judgment.

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
1977).

See supra Part II.C.
See supra Part II.C.
See supra text accompanying note 23030.
See supraPart IV.C.
See also Boatland, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 558 F.2d 818, 822 n.2 (6th Cir.
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B. Effects on Conflict of Laws in the Absence of a Choice by the
Parties
Although the new paradigm has been developed for party
autonomy, it could also have an effect on how we deal with conflicts of
laws in general. In the large majority of cases, the parties do not
choose the applicable law. This is the classic area of conflict-of-laws
theory, and the one that arguably raises the most problems in
practice. The question is how this field should be dealt with: should it
be viewed from the parties' perspective or from the perspective of the
states involved?
The traditional answer has been the latter. Absent of any choice
by the parties, theories look for "connecting factors" to states, states'
257
"interests," the "predominantly concerned jurisdiction," and so on.
But the approach could also be different: since party autonomy
trumps all other conflict rules (except for public policy), it might also
influence the default rules that apply in absence of an autonomous
choice. For one can consider cases in which the parties have not
agreed on the applicable law -and in which public policy does not
prevent them from doing so- as an area of "possible choice of law".
Instead of deciding those cases weighing the different states' contacts
or interests, we could also look at them from the viewpoint of the
individuals who are able to choose the applicable law. Through this
shift of perspective, we would see the question of conflicts very
differently. Considerations related to the preferences of the parties
would no longer be a mere maverick of conflicts theory, but take
center stage.
The justification for such a different approach lies in the fact
that the states themselves have allowed the parties to choose the
applicable law. By doing so, they have implicitly recognized that in
certain areas of the law the convenience and needs of the individuals
are more important than the jurisdiction, interests, or policies of the
state. States have subordinated their other policies to the idea of the
autonomy of the parties. Only in the field of public policy are states
overriding a choice of law by the parties because of their own interest
preferences. In all other fields, they accept that the parties can
deviate from their policies by an express choice. If this is so, is it not
more sensible to give the parties' intentions and needs a prominent
place even if they have failed to make them explicit?
One could argue against such an approach because it would force
the judge into a complicated and futile investigation of the parties'
hypothetical intentions.2 58 This result would indeed be the most

257.
See supra Part III.D.
258.
The Restatement and the Rome Convention both reject hypothetical choice
of law. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 187 cmt. a (1971); GIULIANO &
LAGARDE, supra note 44, art. 3, cmt. 3.
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undesirable. It is hard to determine the will of the parties if they
have not expressed it themselves. 259
Such a method would
necessarily substitute the parties' intentions by what the judge
thinks they would prefer. That is not what is proposed here.
Instead, what is meant is that the shift to the parties gives the
judge more liberty in deciding on the applicable law than if he were to
focus on the states that have connections to the case. For instance, he
would not be bound to apply the law of the state where a particular
tort occurred. Instead, he could focus on the parties to a tort action.
Questions he could ask would be: In what law does it make sense to
address the litigants? Is there a particular law that fits them best? If
they are both from the same state, one could justify the application of
the law of that state because both parties know that law well and can
identify with it. Both would understand if the judge applied it since
they can best argue on the bases of it. Like their language, it fits
260
their culture and their background.
The result is, of course, not new: it is the same decision Judge
Fuld of the New York Court of Appeals reached in the famous case
Babcock v. Jackson.26 1 The difference is that Judge Fuld relied on
governmental interest analysis to reach the result, 262 while another
method is suggested here. The reason for the application of the law of
the common domicile is not the interests of a state concerned, but the
interest of the parties to which the law of their domicile is well-known
and fitting. The advantage of such justification is that it liberates the
analysis from more abstract ideas of state interests. What the
interests of the state of New York are in a private litigation between
two of its residents over a car accident in Ontario is a matter that is
quite difficult to decide. Yet it is quite easy to see that it is in the
interest of two residents of New York that the law of their common
domicile is applied to a dispute between them. The method suggested
here replaces the fight on the interstate level with a bottom-down
approach that focuses on the interests of the individuals involved in a
case.

259.
The Article does not address cases in which a reasonable argument could be
made for an implicit choice of law. One case in which such an argument could have
been brought forward is the famous decision in Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374 (Mass.
1878). Because the defendant in this case wanted to enter into a binding contract but
could not do so under the law of her home state, it made sense to assume that she
implicitly agreed to the law of the other party under which the contract was valid. Id.
See supra note 24747 and accompanying text (discussing the rule of validation). Public
policy did not exclude such a choice. See Milliken, 125 Mass. at 383. The case is
normally analyzed very differently.
See CURRIE, supra note 2, at 76-121; LEA
BRILMAYER, Governmental Interest Analysis: A House Without Foundations,46 OHIO

ST. L.J. 459, 467 (1985).
260.
See supra Part IV.C (drawing the parallel between law and language).
261.
Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 289 (N.Y. 1963).
262.
Id.

2008]

PAR TYAUTONOMYIN CONFLICT OF LAWS

This method can equally explain the result of the decision in
Dym v. Gordon.263 In this case, both parties were residing in New
264
York, but had teamed up to go as summer students to Colorado.
Since they lived together in Colorado and their whole personal
relationship was based on their being together in that state, it may
have made sense to address them under Colorado law. Judge Burke
at least thought so. He cited "the general intent of the parties as
inferred from their actions" to justify the application of the law of
Colorado. 265 As an argument as to why New York law was not
applicable, he stressed that it would be a law the parties in "no sense
had adopted. '266 But he gave no indication why the intentions of the
parties or their "adoption" of a law was to be considered under
governmental interest analysis, the standard he used. 267 It requires
at least a number of abstractions and intellectual distortions to think
that Colorado's interest as a state could be influenced in any way by
the decision of some New Yorkers to do their summer studies there.
Judge Fuld, in his dissenting opinion, had every reason to be puzzled
over the application of his own doctrine.2 68 In reality, Burke relied
not on states' interests, but on those of the parties. This can also be
seen from his telling argument that the application of Colorado law
would not be "unfair" or "fortuitous. '269 Unfair or fortuitous to
whom? The application of the law of one state cannot be "unfair" to
another. What Judge Burke meant is that the parties could have
considered it "unfair" or "fortuitous" if the court had not applied the
law of Colorado. Thus, it was the individuals' interests that governed
the choice of law.
The limited space of this Article does not allow analysis of all
possible conflict cases under the new paradigm. It is likely that the
results will often be similar or identical to those that have been
reached under the influence of the U.S. conflict-of-laws revolution.
The difference is that the focus on the individual provides a
consistent theoretical framework for the results that the
revolutionists sought. Arguments such as "fairness," "fortuitousness,"
or justice for the individual become the central concern of conflicts
theory and no longer have to be cloaked under alleged state interests.
Even more, the new approach can also solve the cases which interest
analysis does not provide for: if no state has an interest in the
application of its laws, governmental interest analysis does not yield

263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
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Dym v. Gordon, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463, 475 (N.Y. 1965).
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Id. at 467.
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Id. at 470 (Fuld, J., dissenting).
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any solution.2 70 But the individualist approach suggested here shows
why in these cases a law has to be applied: because it is in the
interest of the parties of the case. Hence, the focus on the parties
may also lead the way to find the applicable law in cases in which no
state has an interest.
A final advantage is the flexibility of the approach, which can be
demonstrated by using a hypothetical example slightly deviating from
the fact pattern of Babcock v. Jackson271: suppose that a German
tourist and a Spanish tourist have an accident while driving together
in a rented car in Ontario. Suppose further that the guest statute
cited in Babcock v. Jackson,2 72 which excludes any damages, is still
part of Ontario law, and that German and Spanish law allow for
compensation, but under each law a different amount of damages
would have to be granted to the victim. Using the new paradigm to
solve this case, it is easy to explain why Ontario law should not apply,
even though the parties do not come from the same state as they did
in Babcock. The reason is that it would not be appropriate for the
judge to communicate with the German and the Spaniard using
Ontario law; it would be strange, unexpected as to its content, and
therefore entirely "fortuitous" and unfair to apply Ontario law to
them. The fact that they both come from different countries, which
deviates from the setting in Babcock, would not matter. We could
take into consideration such facts as the common European culture of
the parties,, which binds them closer to each other than to Ontario.
Such considerations are totally banned under any of the other
conflicts theories, which focus on the authority of the rulemaker, not
on the needs and interests of the parties.
The private approach to conflicts of law thus provides a large
Additionally, it provides a consistent
amount of flexibility.
theoretical framework to justify the application of a law other than
the law of the place where a contract was made or the facts of a tort
occurred. In focusing on the private relationship, it allows the judge
to consider and understand the parties and their background when
choosing the applicable law. He or she is not restricted by any
geographical or other connection to a particular state.
Of course, policy issues are not totally excluded from the conflicts
realm. There might be political considerations that influence the
applicable law even in the absence of mandatory laws. The state
could, for instance, adopt a policy to favor the victim of torts and
point to the law that provides for the larger amount of damages. The
approach suggested here should not be understood as being isolated
from such legislative directions. It can overlap with policies, and

See CURRIE, supra note 2, at 152-53 (discussing the case where no state
270.
has an interest in the application of its laws).
Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 281-82 (N.Y. 1963).
271.
Id. at 283.
272.

2008}

PARTYAUTONOMYIN CONFLICT OF LAWS

even be superseded by them.
The inclusion of considerations
regarding the parties is not meant as a "one-size-fits-all" solution for
each and every conflicts case, but rather as a general reminder that
we should focus more on the individual, and less on the state as the
drafter of the rules when deciding on the applicable law.

VI. SUMMARY

Traditional conflicts theory is not able to cope with a new
phenomenon: the growing importance of party autonomy. Although
freedom of individual choice of law is recognized more and more in
legislation and is the one principle that is most applied in practice, it
takes only a marginal place in conflicts theory. Through this Article,
it has become clear why this is so: the standard theories view conflictof-laws problems as disputes between states over the application of
their legal system. The parties' power to choose the applicable law
cannot be squared with this perspective. It is impossible to explain
why private individuals would be able to influence the relations
between states, their competencies and interests, and why they could
even make the law of a state applicable that has no connection to or
interest in the dispute.
The solution suggested here is to radically shift the focus from
the state to the parties involved in the dispute. It is their needs and
wishes that have to be accommodated by the choice-of-law process.
Thereby, it becomes clear why the parties can choose the applicable
law, within the sole boundaries of mandatory state interests
expressed through public policy. If we put the individual in the
center of the conflicts analysis, we are able to justify the possibility of
private choice of law.
This new method could also have an effect on how we deal with
conflicts of laws in general.
For example, it could impact our
interpretation of cases in which the parties have not agreed on the
applicable law but in which public policy would not have prevented
them from doing so. Instead of approaching the conflict from the
point of view of states' policy, we could look at it from the perspective
of the individuals who can choose the applicable law. Considerations
related to the parties would no longer be a mere maverick of conflicts
theory, but become a central idea.
Another result of this study is a new normative category:
relatively mandatory rules of law. The Article has compared legal
rules to those of another system that applies flexibly on the
transnational level: language. Relatively mandatory rules of law and
language are similar because both are binding from an inside view,
but the parties are free to choose another system to apply. The rise
and the effects of this new category of legal rules are related to the
changing position of the individual in choice of law.
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Finally, it is important to emphasize that the Article does not
consider rules of public policy, which limit the parties' power to
choose the applicable law. These rules are related to the authority of
the state over a certain territory and persons, the state's interests,
and so on. They pose intricate problems, which are very different
from the ones raised by party autonomy. Moreover, they have
intensively been debated by others. The goal of this Article is to
establish that, outside of these problems, another field of conflict of
laws exists: it is the field of individual liberty.

